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Introduction
 If  there is one idea that will define both the work of  Hannah Arendt and its legacy for 
future generations, it is her theory of  political action. But both Arendt’s theory and its legacy thus 
far have been anything but unambiguous; the following, then, is an attempt to clarify the 
phenomenon of  action as presented in her work. The path I follow to this end, however, calls for 
some preliminary remarks. Much of  this essay consists in an extended analysis of  the concept of  
“worldhood” in the work of  Arendt and of  her erstwhile mentor, Martin Heidegger. Since the 
subject of  this paper is action, a “practical” concern if  there ever was one, such a lengthy discussion 
of  an abstract, “theoretical” concept like “worldhood” might perhaps seem peculiar and out of  
place. Even more peculiar, perhaps, is the way this discussion is structured, with Arendt’s conception 
of  “world” appearing twice; first in the beginning, followed by a discussion of  Heidegger’s theory, 
and then concluding with a return to Arendt. 
 The second peculiarity, in my mind, is justified by the first. The fundamental premise of  this 
essay is that Arendt’s account of  action cannot be fully understood without considering its 
phenomenological underpinnings – and moreover, that her account does not actually make very 
much sense absent such consideration. One might think that the proper way to proceed, then, would 
be to discuss the works I consider chronologically. But this would entail beginning with a protracted 
discussion of  Heidegger’s Being and Time, which would be unacceptable for two reasons. Firstly, 
Heidegger’s philosophy is notoriously complex and difficult to understand – let alone explain – both 
due to Heidegger’s convoluted, jargon-ridden prose, and to the genuinely revolutionary and difficult  
ideas that he presents. Thus, to subject the reader to such a discussion would be unfair without 
giving him or her some indication in advance that such a lengthy philosophical digression is likely to 
be productive. The second reason for this somewhat peculiar structure is that in any 
phenomenological inquiry – and any inquiry into the work of  Arendt and Heidegger, particularly 
into the phenomenon of  action, is necessarily phenomenological – it is necessary that the phenomenon 
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to be investigated be made apparent at the outset of  the inquiry, even in a provisional form, so that the 
analysis may be then directed towards the clarification of  that phenomenon. 
 The structure of  the paper, then, is as follows. In the first section, I begin with an account of  
action within the context of  the vita activa as laid out by Arendt in The Human Condition. I then 
proceed to identify some of  the more perplexing features of  her account, and suggest that they are 
confounding enough to throw the coherency of  what Arendt is saying into question. Taking my cue 
from Hanna Pitkin, I then argue that we can understand action as activity informed by thinking, by 
drawing upon Arendt’s posthumously published work The Life of  the Mind. This account, however, 
though illuminating with regard to some aspects of  political action, will be shown to possess serious 
deficiencies in others. Thus, I will proceed in section two to explicate Heidegger’s conception of  
“worldhood,” and will demonstrate that Arendt’s conception of  “the world of  appearances” in The 
Life of  the Mind is essentially derivative of  this account. I will then go on in section three to show 
that Arendt’s conception of  the “world” in The Human Condition is fundamentally a critique of  
Heidegger’s account, and that far from being derivative, Arendt actually exposes major deficiencies 
in Heidegger’s notion of  worldhood. I will then conclude by giving an account of  action as taking 
responsibility for the world, with the world understood as a space for action and freedom. 
 One final issue remains to be addressed. Though my preliminary account of  action as 
thoughtful activity is, I believe, fundamentally correct, Arendt herself  did not ascribe to this view – 
in fact, she argued fairly consistently that thought and action were diametrically opposed faculties. 
Though my intention in this paper is far from exposing some sort of  “contradiction” in Arendt’s 
thought – a ludicrous endeavor, I think, since it seems to presuppose Arendt’s “thought” as a 
discrete, unchanging entity – this does raise the issue of  what status, exactly, my work here holds in 
relation to hers. My answer is that I am interested in Arendt’s account of  action not with regard to 
her presentation, but to what she presents: the phenomenon of  action. Because this phenomenon has 
been dealt with so insightfully by Arendt, there is no way any investigation of  action could proceed 
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without engaging her account; any more than one could discuss the “will to power” – supposing one 
took it for a real phenomenon – without discussing Nietzsche (one could ignore Arendt’s entirely, 
but this would amount to either a pointless retreading of  ground she had already covered, or a 
discussion of  something fundamentally different than what she is talking about). But nonetheless, 
because I am not interested in what Arendt has to say as such, but rather in the underlying 
phenomenon, this essay will surely appear as something of  a creative interpretation of  Arendt’s 
account – particularly in the third section, where I present Arendt’s critique of  Heidegger while at 
the same time critiquing some aspects of  her position. In fact, the third section of  this paper 
amounts to less a straightforward presentation of  Arendt’s view than a sort of  synthesis of  Arendt’s 
account with Heidegger’s philosophy. Since Arendt herself  was a frequent practitioner of  such 
“creative” (some would say “violent”) interpretations, I do not think she would object to this. On 
the contrary, in her introduction to The Human Condition Margaret Canovan quotes Arendt as saying:
Each time you write something and you send it out into the world and it becomes public, 
obviously everybody is free to do with it as he pleases, and this is how it should be. I do not 
have any quarrel with this. You should not try to hold your hand now on whatever may 
happen to what you have been thinking for yourself. You should rather try to learn from 
what other people do with it.1
All of  which is to say that I have attempted to distinguish my exposition of  Arendt’s account from 
my own thinking, and that the account of  action I present in this essay is ultimately my own, as 
derivative and nugatory as it may be.
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1 Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1998), xx.
I. Action and the World of  Appearances
 What is the meaning of  action in the work of  Hannah Arendt? This is the fundamental 
question that will guide my thinking in this paper; but before I can attempt an answer, some 
clarification is in order. What does it “mean” to inquire into something’s meaning? Though I will 
return to this issue at various points in this essay, it seems worthwhile at this juncture to make a 
tentative point which I think will clarify the direction of  what follows. The New Oxford American 
Dictionary provides three definitions of  “meaning,” which for our purposes might be condensed into 
two. The first is “what is meant by a word, text, concept, or action,” which we might parse as “what 
something is.” The second is something’s “implied or explicit significance” or “important or 
worthwhile quality,” which we might say is the point of  a thing (the meaning of  life, for example). On 
closer inspection, then, there are really two questions being posed here: What is action? And what is 
its point?
 The fact that the first of  these questions, at least, seems somewhat straightforward should 
not mislead us into thinking that it possesses a straightforward answer. What Walter Kaufmann once 
wrote of  Nietzsche could easily be said for Arendt; that though “we find that practically every 
sentence and every page of  his writings” less troublesome “than the involved and technical periods 
of  Kant, Hegel and even Schopenhauer… it is perhaps easier to form an opinion of  the general 
meaning of  Kant’s Critique of  Pure Reason” than to do the same for any of  Nietzsche’s works, despite 
the fact that “in Nietzsche’s books the individual sentences seem clear enough.”2 As Margret 
Canovan notes, The Human Condition’s lack of  “a clearly apparent argumentative structure” has often 
led to the “bewilderment” of  its readers, many of  whom “have found it hard to understand what is 
actually going on in the book.”3
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2 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 72.
3 HC, viii.
 Indeed, Arendt’s clear prose has not prevented even thoughtful interpreters, such as Dana 
Villa, from falling into elementary errors of  exposition in discussing Arendt’s conception of  action. 
Following George Kateb,4 Villa contends that for Arendt, “genuine political action is nothing other 
than a certain kind of  talk, a variety of  conversation or argument about public matters.”5 To be sure, 
Arendt does indeed stress the interrelatedness of  speech and action; “speechless action,” she writes, 
“would no longer be action because… the actor, the doer of  deeds, is possible only if  he is at the 
same time the speaker of  words.”6 But the very fact that she distinguishes between the two faculties 
evidences that they are not identical phenomena, that action is not “nothing other than talk,” neither 
for her nor the world. Indeed, Arendt states the matter quite clearly in On Violence when she writes 
that “the practice of  violence, like all action, changes the world…”7 and in The Human Condition 
when she speaks of  the shift “from action to speech”8 in the ancient Greek polis. 
 But setting aside the manifold textual evidence that could be brought to bear in refuting 
Villa’s interpretation, perhaps the most compelling reason to reject his reading is that it does 
violence to action’s place within the vita activa of  The Human Condition, where it, alongside labor and 
work, represents one of  the “fundamental human activities” corresponding to “the basic conditions 
under which life on earth has been given to man.”9 For if  action is mere talk, one wonders about the 
conspicuous omission of  the other activities “that go on directly between men,”10 not to mention 
the mysterious fate that befalls the first half  of  Phoenix’ description of  Achilles as "the doer of  
great deeds and the speaker of  great words,"11 which Arendt invokes repeatedly to evoke the essence 
6
4 See George Kateb, “Political Action: Its Nature and Advantages,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. 
Dana Villa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 133.
5 Dana Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of  the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 31.
6 HC, 179.
7 Hannah Arendt, “On Violence” in Crises of  the Republic (New York: Harvest/HBJ, 1972), 177. Arendt could of  course 





of  action. Neither what action is for Arendt, nor its point, can be understood without placing it 
within the context of  the vita activa; and it is towards explicating action’s place within this account 
that we shall now turn. 
Action and the Vita Activa
 Arendt states at the outset of  The Human Condition that her intent is “nothing more than to 
think what we are doing,”12 and the phrase “what we are doing” is meant in a very literal sense. The 
crux of  The Human Condition is the threefold distinction Arendt draws between labor, work and 
action, which together comprise the vita activa; the active life, in contradistinction to the vita 
contemplativa, the life of  the philosopher. According to Arendt, the prejudices of  philosophers since 
Plato against the “trifles”13 of  human affairs have led to an effacement of  the distinctions within the 
vita activa itself, to which she intends to restore dignity by reviving our awareness of  those distinct 
experiences. 
 The first component of  the vita activa is labor, “which corresponds to the biological process 
of  the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the 
vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labor.”14 Labor, for Arendt, is merely one 
side of  the never-ending biological process, the other side of  which is consumption; within the labor 
cycle, the “fruits” of  our labors are immediately consumed and used to replenish our bodies’ vital 
energies, which are in turn used to produce more objects to be consumed. The paradigmatic 
example of  what Arendt calls animal laborans (the laboring animal, or man viewed under the aspect of 
labor) is the subsistence farmer who spends his days toiling in the fields, producing only enough to 
sustain himself  for the next day of  labor. The truly definitive aspect of  labor, however, is necessity; 
thus, as Arendt notes, “to have a society of  laborers, it is of  course not necessary that every member 
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12 HC, 5. 
13 Plato, Laws VII, 803c.
14 HC, 7.
actually be a laborer or worker… but only that all members consider whatever they do primarily as a 
way to sustain their own lives and those of  their families”15 (this is the fate, which is somewhat 
incidental to our analysis here, that Arendt believes has befallen modern society).  
 In contrast to labor, which is bound up in the natural life process of  the human species, 
work “corresponds to the unnaturalness of  human existence,” and provides “an ‘artificial’ world of  
things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings.”16 While the word “labor” can only be used 
to refer to the act of  laboring, which leaves behind no lasting product, it is significant here that the 
word “work” can be used to refer both to the act of  working and the finished product. The 
paradigmatic example of  homo faber is the artisan, whose craft is conducted in terms of  means (the 
production process) and ends (the finished product). From the perspective of  animal laborans, work 
offers a twofold “redemption” of  labor; by offering tools that “ease the pain and trouble of  
laboring,” and by erecting “a world of  durability” for persons to inhabit.17 The defining aspect of  
work is that it is oriented by an end– the idea of  the object to be made, a sort of  mental blueprint, 
that is raised up in the mind of  the craftsman before he begins his work, thus guiding the “means” 
he employs to that end. 
 The dynamics of  work, however, entail their own set of  problems for homo faber. To be more 
precise, the trouble starts when the logic of  means and ends, which Arendt claims are valid only in 
the sphere of  work, invades other aspects of  life (this is a recurring theme in The Human Condition – 
equally problematic for Arendt is the encroachment of  labor and necessity upon work and action). 
And there is no doubt that this employment of  means-end reasoning is pervasive, particularly in 
politics. Max Weber once wrote that “all serious reflection about the ultimate elements of  
meaningful human conduct is oriented primarily in terms of  the categories ‘end’ and ‘means’”18; and 
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15 HC, 46. 
16 HC, 7.
17 HC, 236.
18 Max Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” 52.
not only would many agree with him, but it is also likely that they would find such a proposition to 
be self-evident, even beyond dispute. But Arendt argues that the application of  means-end logic to 
politics carries with it some disturbing implications.
 For one, orienting political action towards some supreme end by definition justifies all means 
employed towards that end – for what is an end but a justification of  why certain means are being 
employed? The goal of  “making” a truly just society, of  realizing a utopian blueprint, has justified 
untold human suffering throughout the 20th century; the Soviet Union being the most obvious 
example (though it is worth pointing out that the opposite goal -- stopping the spread of  
communism -- has justified comparable evils). As the old cliché goes, “you can’t make an omelet 
without breaking a few eggs”; the eggs, in this case, merely happening to be people. To be sure, one 
can of  course invoke other “values” or “ends” to oppose cruel or inhumane means; but insofar as 
something like “communism” or “stopping communism” is set out as the ultimate end, there is no 
way subordinate ends can prevail within this argumentative framework. And as soon as one attempts 
to argue that “not all means are permissible” or that “under certain circumstances means may be 
more important than ends,” Arendt rightly points out that one begins “to speak in paradoxes, the 
definition of  an end being precisely the justification of  the means.”19 In other words, these 
arguments are in a sense eminently reasonable, as they reflect our justifiable horror at the evils 
engendered by means-end reasoning; but they are also doomed to failure, as they remain trapped 
within a conceptual framework that invariably ensures their defeat. As long as we conceive of  
politics principally in terms of  means and ends, Arendt argues, we shall be perpetual witnesses to the 
story Randall Jarrell pithily expressed in his poem “A War”: 
There set out, slowly, for a Different World,
At four, on winter mornings, different legs . . .
You can't break eggs without making an omelet
– That's what they tell the eggs.
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19 HC, 229. 
 But there is also a second, equally disturbing problem entailed by means-end reasoning. Not 
only do ends, by their very nature, justify all means; the framework of  means and ends is also totally 
impotent when it comes to justifying the ends themselves. Utilitarianism, for example, is a 
philosophical doctrine that holds that the end of  all action should be to maximize the utility of  the 
greatest number of  people. But, as Arendt writes, the “perplexity of  utilitarianism is that it gets 
caught in the unending chain of  means and ends without ever arriving at some principle which 
could justify the category of  means and end, that is, of  utility itself.” In other words, the utilitarian 
has no answer when asked “the question which Lessing once put to the utilitarian philosophers of  
his time: ‘And what is the use of  use?’”20 The problem, Arendt claims, is that “the ‘in order to’ has 
become the content of  the ‘for the sake of ’; in other words, utility established as meaning generates 
meaninglessness.”21 This perplexity, which emerges as soon as one approaches the “for the sake of ” 
in terms of  means and ends, is poetically expressed by the The Kinks in the song “Oklahoma 
U.S.A.”: “All life we work, but work is a bore. If  life’s for living, what’s living for?”
 As one might suspect at this point, the problems inherent in the mentality of  homo faber are 
redeemed, for Arendt, through the faculty of  action. Action, she writes, is the “only activity that 
goes on directly between men without the intermediary of  things or matter,” and “corresponds to 
the human condition of  plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the 
world.”22 Through action and the related faculty of  speech, man has the unique ability “to 
communicate himself  and not merely something… through them, men distinguish themselves 
instead of  being merely distinct… like a second birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselves 
the naked fact of  our original physical appearance.”23 Action is also man’s capacity to start 




22 HC, 7. 
23 HC, 176.
24 HC, 178.
opposed to labor, which is an endlessly recurring cycle, and work, which always pursues a 
predictable, definite aim. In contrast to work, Arendt stresses that action has no end; both because it 
sets in motion unpredictable processes “that can quite literally endure... until mankind itself  has 
come to an end,”25 and because it is a self  contained activity, a true “end unto itself,” in much the 
same way that the goal of  a performing – as opposed to a plastic – art is contained within the 
performance itself.26 Additionally, action solves homo faber’s “predicament of  meaningless, the 
‘devaluation of  all values,’” because of  its capacity to “produce meaningful stories as naturally as 
fabrication produces use objects.”27
 All three of  the activities Arendt identifies within the vita activa refer to phenomena that can 
be found in the world – but at the same time they designate something more as well, what we might 
express imperfectly as the proper ethos associated with each of  these spheres. That is not to say that 
there is a clear division to be made here between phenomenon and ethos (quite the contrary, I would 
argue), but merely to draw attention to the fact that, as Hanna Pitkin points out, there is a certain 
ambiguity with regard to what Arendt is actually referring to when she speaks of  labor, work, and 
action.28 At this point, I hope to have made clear the domain of  activities that Arendt designates 
with these terms; hopefully, both the ethos of  labor and that of  work should be somewhat clear as 
well. But I entertain no such hope with regard to the ethos of  action. Indeed, while action is perhaps 
the easiest component to grasp of  the vita activa in terms of  domain – it’s simply what goes on 
between people – almost every specific claim Arendt makes about action seems perplexing at first 
glance. It is to the consideration of  these perplexities that I will turn next, with the intent that their 
consideration shall both further illuminate what action is, and point the way towards why it matters. 
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25 HC, 233.
26 See “What is Freedom?” is Between Past and Future, (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 152. It is valid to question 
whether is tenable to place “plastic” and “performing” arts within different categories of  the vita activa in the way Arendt 
seems to do here; I will suggest later in this essay that the “creative act” more generally is an area in which her distinction 
between work and action beings to break down. 
27 HC, 236.
28 Hanna Pitkin, The Attack of  the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of  the Social (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1998), 
179.
 Before continuing, however, it is necessary to make a brief  clarifying point now in order to 
avoid confusion later. The component activities of  the vita activa, the use of  terms like animal laborans 
and homo faber notwithstanding, do not designate classes of  people; rather, they are just that, activities 
people engage in. To the extent that we are bound by the needs of  our bodies, we are all implicated 
in at least the consumption side of  the laboring process; moreover, to the extent that we “work” to 
“make a living,” our work is conducted under the aspect of  labor and necessity, whether we are a 
craftsman or a congressman or a professional academic. Furthermore, even one who finds 
employment in a genuinely non-productive, laboring capacity may produce works in his spare time, 
and thus contribute to the totality of  reified objects that we call the “world.”29 And to the extent that 
we are all human beings who interact with other human beings in word and deed, even in a private 
capacity,30 we are men and women of  action. Indeed, action is an activity from which, Arendt claims, 
“no human being can refrain and still be human.” For while it is possible, for an individual at least, 
to refrain from labor and work, “a life without speech and without action… is literally dead to the 
world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men.”31
The Perplexities of  Action
 As mentioned above, Arendt’s description of  action in The Human Condition and elsewhere is 
somewhat puzzling. Perhaps the most immediately strange element of  action is Arendt’s insistence 
that it takes place outside the realm of  means and ends. Arendt, of  course, does speak of  “motives” 
and “aims” with regard to action, but only in the context of  making the even more befuddling 
12
29 Taken to the extreme of  triviality, even a blog entry or tweet is in a sense a “reified thought,” and thus a contribution 
to the human artifice.  
30 See Hannah Arendt, “Some Questions of  Moral Philosophy” in Responsibility and Judgement (New York: Random 
House, 2003), 112, for a discussion of  action in the private sphere. While Arendt’s discussion of  action in The Human 
Condition is almost exclusively of  action in a political sense, there is no reason to think that she thinks of  action itself  as 
exclusively political; indeed, banishing action from the private sphere would do violence to the completeness of  the vita 
activa and raise the aforementioned question of  what we are to make of  the other activities that go on “between men.”
31 HC, 176
statement that “action, to be free, must be free from motive on one side, and its intended goal as a 
predictable effect on the other.”32 Arendt continues:
That is not to say that motives and aims are not important factors in every single act, but 
they are its determining factors, and action is free to the extent that it is able to transcend 
them… Action insofar as it is free is neither under the guidance of  the intellect nor under 
the dictate of  the will… but springs from something altogether different which… I shall call 
a principle… such principles are honor or glory, love of  equality, which Montesquieu called 
virtue, or distinction or excellence… but also fear or distrust or hatred… Freedom or its 
opposite appears in the world whenever such principles are actualized; the appearance of  
freedom, like the manifestation of  principles, coincides with the performing act. Men are 
free… as long as they act, neither before not after; for to be free and to act are the same.33
 
 And the perplexities do not end there. Arendt goes on to say that if  “we understand the 
political in the sense of  the polis, its end or raison d'être would be to establish and keep in existence a 
space where freedom as virtuosity can appear,”34; with freedom’s “field of  experience” being 
action.35 This seems utterly confusing, and not just because we are accustomed to thinking of  
politics as a means to private happiness. For if  the end of  politics is to make room for freedom, and 
if  freedom is political action, then politics and action are always self-referential; the end of  politics is 
politics, the end of  action is action. But this seems a grotesque misunderstanding of  what politics is 
about. Even if  Arendt concedes that “most words and deeds are about some worldly objective reality 
in addition to being a disclosure of  the acting and speaking agent,”36 isn’t it absurd to say that the 
real point of  politics isn’t about what we talk about when we talk about politics – the conditions of  
the poor, for example, which Arendt calls “the social question” and insists emphatically must be kept 
out of  politics37 – but merely, as it were, the exhilarating sense of  freedom we find in politics itself ?
13






37 See virtually the entirety of  On Revolution; particularly page 102, where Arendt writes that “the whole record of  past 
revolutions demonstrates beyond doubt that every attempt to solve the social question with political means leads to 
terror.”
 Another layer of  difficulty is added when one considers the relationship of  action to what 
Arendt in The Human Condition calls “behavior.” Behavior seems to be a sort of  bastard activity for 
Arendt, occupying no place within the vita activa; though it apparently corresponds to roughly the 
same domain of  activity as action. Indeed, the first mention of  behavior in The Human Condition is in 
reference to action, which she says “would be an unnecessary luxury, a capricious interference with 
general laws of  behavior, if  men were endlessly reproducible repetitions of  the same model, whose 
nature or essence was the same for all and as predictable as the nature or essence of  any other 
thing.”38 When Arendt next mentions it, it is in the context of  “society,” which “excludes the 
possibility of  action”; instead expecting “from each of  its members a certain kind of  behavior, 
imposing innumerable and various rules, all of  which tend to ‘normalize’ its members, to make them 
behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement.”39 In other words, behavior “is a 
kind of  uncritical self-subjection to unquestioned rules,”40 as Hanna Pitkin puts it; “action manqué, 
the failure to act, opportunities for action missed or denied, an abdication of  one’s human capacity 
and responsibility to act.”41 Pitkin’s interpretation of  the relationship between behavior and action, 
however, is problematic, as she herself  notes. “If  behavior is the failure to act,” she writes, “how 
does one tell it from deliberate inaction… the action of  refraining? …Besides, we know that 
behavior is by no means equivalent to doing nothing; it often involves obsessive, even frantic 
activity.”42
 Setting aside for the moment the other perplexities we have identified, I want to focus 
further on the relationship between behavior and action, which I think is key to understanding the 
meaning of  action in Arendt’s thought. We can gain some understanding of  this relationship by 
examining briefly a figure who epitomizes “behaving” as opposed to “acting” man: Adolf  
14





Eichmann. It is not necessary here to discuss the role Eichmann played during the Holocaust, nor 
his subsequent capture and trial in Israel, which Arendt covered for The New Yorker and from which 
she coined the term “the banality of  evil.” But it is worth quoting Arendt on what she saw as 
Eichmann’s most distinguishing feature: his inability to think.
[In covering Eichmann’s trial,] I was struck by a manifest shallowness... that made it 
impossible to trace the incontestable evil of  his deeds to any deeper level of  roots or 
motives. The deeds were monstrous, but the doer… was quite ordinary, commonplace, and 
neither demonic nor monstrous… the only notable characteristic one could detect [in him] 
was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but thoughtlessness… His cliché-ridden 
language produced… a kind of  macabre comedy. 43
 
 Arendt’s comments indicate here – and I think this is a relatively intuitive point – that 
“behavior” in the Arendtian sense stems from an absence of  thought in those who are behaving. It 
follows, then, that the meaning of  action is related intimately to our faculty of  thinking. But surprisingly, 
Arendt does not ascribe to this notion; on the contrary, she emphasizes repeatedly that “Action… 
stands in the sharpest possible opposition to the solitary business of  thought.”44 To this, I quote (via 
Arendt) Kant’s observation that “it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an 
author has expressed in regard to his subject… to find that we understand him better than he has 
understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or 
even thought, in opposition to his own intention.”45 Indeed, there are several moments in Arendt’s 
reflections on thought and action where she seems to manifestly contradict herself, even within the 
same paragraph; but before we can consider why this may be the case, it must first be established 
that the link between thought and action which I am alleging exists in the first place. To this end, we 
now turn to Arendt’s reflections on thinking in The Life of  the Mind.
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Truth, Meaning and the World of  Appearances
 The key to understanding what Arendt means by “thinking” in The Life of  the Mind is the 
distinction she draws between cognition, the acquisition of  knowledge, and thinking, the quest for 
meaning. Before proceeding to discuss this distinction, however, it is necessary to attend to the 
phenomenology of  what Arendt calls “the world of  appearances” – a term that corresponds to what 
Arendt merely calls “the world” in The Human Condition.46 
 “In this world which we enter,” Arendt writes, “appearing from a nowhere, and from which 
we disappear into a nowhere, Being and Appearing coincide.”47 The old two-world theories in which 
there is a “true” world of  “forms” or “things-in-themselves” beneath the world of  appearances, 
Arendt contends, no longer make sense in the modern age. All there is, or at least all that could 
possibly be relevant to human existence, is appearance all the way down. Because of  this, though we 
appear in a world that is common to us all, that world seems different to each individual; “Seeming – 
the it-seems-to-me, dokei moi – is the mode, perhaps the only possible one, in which an appearing 
world is acknowledged and perceived.”48
 The subjectivity of  perception is mitigated, however, by the presence of  what Arendt calls 
“common sense,” which fits “the sensations of  my strictly private five senses… into a common 
world shared by others.”49 It is this “sixth sense” which guarantees that “members of  the same 
species have the context in common that endows every single object with its particular meaning,” 
and in turn creates “the sensation of  reality”50 (though it seems plain enough that Arendt is wrong to 
say “species”; surely it is only among those sharing a common cultural background that an object 
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obscure the fact that it is not the physical nature of  works that is decisive in making them “worldly”; it is their place 
within the human order of  meanings. A chair is worldly not because of  its physical structure per se, but because of  the 
uses associated with it (sitting, etc.), its aesthetic qualities, emotional associations, etc. – all things “considerably less 
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47 Thinking, 19
48 Ibid, 21. 
49 Ibid, 50. 
50 Ibid.
can be said to have a shared meaning). It is because of  common sense that we can be said to inhabit 
a common world, despite the subjectivity of  individual experience. 
 But this intersubjectively shared set of  meanings that make up our common world by no 
means affords us anything like an “objective” frame of  reference. Quoting Merleau-Ponty, Arendt 
notes that “generally speaking, [appearances] never just reveal; they also conceal – ‘No thing, no side 
of  a thing, shows itself  except by actively hiding the others.’”51 It follows, then, that every culturally 
shared disclosure of  what a thing means inevitably entails a concealment of  other possible ways in 
which that thing could appear. 
 We can see what this relationship between appearing and concealing means in practice by 
looking at the U.S. media’s coverage of  American military engagements in other countries. During 
the first Iraq War, news networks “saturated their coverage with Pentagon press briefings that 
included dramatic visuals of  bombs mounted with cameras striking targets in Iraq,” the result being 
“imagery that made the war look, to use a popular metaphor, like a video game.”52 Thus, “American 
audiences were shown an essentially ‘clean’ war, despite the loss of  an estimated 100,000 Iraqi 
soldiers and perhaps the same number of  civilians…”53 The same revealing-concealing relationship 
is inherent in the language used to cover wars. “Collateral damage,” “regime change” and “enhanced 
interrogation methods” are all phrases that reveal, as they each cause an image to appear in our 
minds; but they also serve to conceal, as the images they conjure up are quite different from other 
images which could be evoked by different descriptions of  the same phenomena (“loss of  innocent 
life,” “unprovoked war of  aggression,” “torture”). The point here is not that the former descriptions 
are deceptive (though one could certainly make that case); but rather that, as Nietzsche says, “There 
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(ed.) Media Power in Politics, Sixth Edition. Washington: CQ Press. 329.
53 Ibid, 330. 
is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing,’”54 with all the limitations that implies for our 
ability to perceive and understand the world. 
 At this point, we can discuss what Arendt means by distinguishing between “cognition” and 
“thinking.” The former, which aims to acquire knowledge and “whose highest criterion is truth, 
derives that criterion from the world of  appearances,”55 and thus remains bound to both our sense 
perceptions and the “common” sense which guarantees our shared world. A false statement – (“the 
sky is green,” for example) can only be refuted by appealing to evidence contrary to that statement; 
and this is either sensory in nature (i.e. taking the person outside and showing them the sky) or refers 
to sensory evidence (saying, “the sky is not green, it’s blue”). Because of  this, “the activity of  
knowing is no less related to our sense of  reality and no less of  a world-building activity than the 
building of  houses.”56 
 But thinking, which searches for the meaning of  things and “subjects everything it gets hold 
of  to doubt, has no such natural, matter-of-fact relation to reality.” On the contrary, it entails a 
withdrawal from the world of  appearances, “from the sensorially given and hence also from the 
feeling of  realness, given by common sense.”57 Instead, thinking stems from (and also leads to) a 
sense of  perplexity, which varies in its intensity in accordance with its object; slight, with regard to 
things like “house,” greater with respect to things like “love” and “justice,” and perhaps greatest of  
all with regard to the meaning of  life itself. Meaning, then, is in a way a narrower concern than 
knowledge, as it deals with the component words and concepts which make up any factual 
statement, but which have no truth-value in themselves (“regime change” is neither a true nor false 
statement; indeed, it is not a statement at all). But it is at the same time also a broader concern, as it 
deals with the fundamental concepts that orient how we understand and act in the world.
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 From the standpoint of  common sense, however, thinking’s search for meaning and the 
withdrawal from the world of  appearances that accompanies it is meaningless, “because it is the 
sixth sense’s function to fit us into the world of  appearances and make us at home in the world 
given by our five senses; there we are and no questions asked.”58 Furthermore, thinking is entirely 
unproductive – the only knowledge Socrates, the thinker par excellence, ever gathered from thinking 
was that that he knew nothing. As Arendt notes: 
Socrates [in searching for the meaning of  a word] concludes virtually every strictly Socratic 
dialogue59 by saying: ‘I have failed utterly to discover what it is.’ And this aporetic character 
of  Socratic thinking means: admiring wonder at just or courageous deeds seen by the eyes of 
the body gives birth to such questions as What is courage? What is justice?… The basic 
Socratic question – what do we mean when we use this class of  words, later called 
‘concepts?’ – arises out of  that experience. But the original wonder is not only not resolved 
in such questions, since they remain without answer, but are even reinforced. What begins as 
wonder ends in perplexity and thence leads back to wonder: How marvelous that men can 
perform courageous or just deeds even though they do not know, can give no account of, 
what courage and justice are.”60 
Thought and Action
 At this point, the similarities between thought and action should seem somewhat obvious. 
Both are self-contained activities with no point outside themselves, and both are indispensable to the 
formation of  meaning, the latter providing the raw material for the former’s generation of  
meaningful stories. “All thought arises out of  experience,” Arendt writes, “but no experience yields 
any meaning or even coherence without undergoing the operations of  imagining and thinking.”61 
But even more importantly, it seems to me that both thought and action form the essential 
preconditions for each other’s existence. We have already seen that thought, for Arendt, always arises 
from the experience of  action62; but on the other side of  the coin, not thinking teaches people “to 
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62 In addition to the two previous quotations, see “‘What Remains? The Language Remains’: A Conversation with 
Günter Gaus” in Essays in Understanding (New York: Schocken Books, 1994), 20. “Every thought is an afterthought,” 
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hold fast to whatever the prescribed rules of  conduct may be at a given time in a given society” – in 
other words, it teaches them to behave and not to act. “What people then get used to is less the 
content of  the rules, a close examination of  which [by thinking] would always lead them into 
perplexity, than the possession of  rules under which to subsume particulars.”63 
 But, as I mentioned previously, this reading is in utmost contradiction to what Arendt herself  
has to say about thought and action. “Action,” she assures us, “stands in the sharpest possible 
opposition to the solitary business of  thought.”64 Thinking “has no political relevance unless special 
emergencies arise,”65 and in those “rare moments when the stakes are on the table,”66 it does not 
lead to action per se, but to the refusal to join in with what everyone else is doing, which “becomes a 
kind of  action”67 through inaction. Arendt also gives us the bizarrely contradictory statement that 
although mental activities “can never directly change reality–indeed in our world there is no clearer 
or more radical opposition than that between thinking and doing–the principles by which we act and 
the criteria by which we judge and conduct our lives depend ultimately on the life of  the mind.”68 
This statement seems so strange that, in the absence of  her other words on the subject, one would 
be tempted to simply give a narrow reading to the “radical opposition” she describes here; but as the 








68 Ibid, 71. Admittedly, “mental activities” for Arendt include willing and judging as well, which I do not discuss at any 
length in this essay. Willing, however, has little to do with “principles” and “concepts,” while judgement depends on the 
“liberating effect of  thinking” (Responsibility and Judgement, 189) for its very existence. If  Arendt’s point about the 
“political irrelevance” of  thought is merely that it does not lead to action “directly,” but rather leads to another activity 
which then leads to action, then her point is, I think, a little pedantic; is it really fair to say that my arm is “irrelevant” to 
catching a ball because it merely has a “liberating effect” on my hand’s ability to be in the correct position? But it seems 
more likely to me, for reasons I discuss below, that Arendt means what she says about thought only being relevant to 
judgement and action in “political emergencies”; and this, I think, is a critical error on her part.
 Obviously, I think Arendt is wrong in this respect. But in the interest of  completeness, let us 
briefly discuss the reasons why Arendt thinks this is the case.  Firstly, she says, thinking always 
involves a “stop-and-think” which interrupts any doing.69 Secondly, action deals with particulars in 
the world, while thought, which withdraws from the world of  appearances, deals with generalities, 
which can never “be valid in the field of  ethics or politics.”70 Finally, Arendt opposes action and 
thought because in action “a We is always engaged in changing our common world,” while thought 
“operates in a dialogue between me and myself.”71
 With regard to the first two of  these reasons, Arendt’s error is rather simple. Previously,72 I 
warned against the mistake of  treating the activities of  the vita activa as corresponding to classes of  
people, instead of  as activities that we all for the most part engage in; here, Arendt falls into that 
very trap herself. For while it seems reasonable enough to say that people cannot think and act 
simultaneously, it is false to speak of  actors and thinkers as if  these designate different species of  
people, as Arendt does on multiple occasions.73 The third point, however, is more complicated, and 
requires revisiting the phenomenology of  the thinking process.
 According to Arendt, thinking always takes the form of  a silent dialogue with one’s self, 
which she calls the “two-in-one.” This inner dialogue is what leads us to strive towards being as we 
wish to appear to others, even when no one else is there to witness our acts; the thought being that 
by doing otherwise, we will destroy the friendship with ourselves which allows us to think. For “who 
would want to be the friend of  and have to live together with a murderer?”74 It is this concern, 
which is absent from those who do not think, that gives rise to one’s character and personality. But 
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doing certain things, even though they are done by everybody around you.”75 Furthermore, this kind 
of  (in)action, “politically speaking,” is “irresponsible,” as “its standard is the self  and not the world, 
neither its improvement nor change.”76 Arendt is guided in these two assertions by the example of  
Socrates, who famously held that it was better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. And this is, indeed, 
an entirely passive proposition. But if  one looks at the thinking experience itself  and not merely this 
particular manifestation of  it, is it not possible that one could think not just “I cannot remain 
friends with myself  if  I do evil,” but also “I cannot keep myself  as a friend if  I do nothing?” Or that 
“I cannot keep myself  as a friend if  I sacrifice the world to maintain my integrity – I must do evil 
things, despite the anguish they cause me, because the alternative is far worse?” (“The time is out of  
joint,” Hamlet says – “O cursed spite, / That ever I was born to set it right!”)
 The example of  Socrates, at least, shows us that thinking is dependent on action; as Arendt 
notes, “the extent to which the old and once very paradoxical statement ‘It is better to suffer wrong 
than to do wrong,’ has won the agreement of  civilized men is due primarily to the fact that Socrates 
gave an example and hence became an example for a certain way of  conduct and a certain way of  
deciding between right and wrong.”77 But since his act was, in a sense, negative (if  one is referring 
merely to his refusal to flee Athens and not his conduct during his trial), we must look elsewhere if  
we are to seek evidence of  action’s dependence on thought, the denial of  which seems to be the 
crux of  Arendt’s insistence on their “radical opposition” to each other.
 To that end, I would like to quote the following recollections at length, which come from a 
man in attendance at a 1969 speech given by Randy Kehler, then head of  the War Resisters League 
in San Francisco:
I was very taken with what a good impression of  America this young man gave. He was very 
articulate, very sincere in his speech, and very earnest. And I was thinking, I’m glad the 
foreigners in this audience are seeing him. What a good example of  an American he is, the best we have. 
And in the course of  his speech he said, “Last month our friend Davis Harris went to prison 
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[for draft resistance]. Terry and John are gone. Yesterday our friend Bob went to jail.” He 
said, “Soon there will be no men left in the office, only women. And I’m very excited that 
soon I’ll be able to join them.”
And he said this very calmly. I hadn't known that he was about to be sentenced for draft 
resistance. It hit me as a total surprise and shock, because I heard his words in the midst of  
actually feeling proud of  my country listening to him. And then I heard he was going to 
prison. It wasn't what he said exactly that changed my worldview. It was the example he was 
setting with his life. How his words in general showed that he was a stellar American, and 
that he was going to jail as a very deliberate choice—because he thought it was the right 
thing to do. There was no question in my mind that my government was involved in an 
unjust war that was going to continue and get larger. Thousands of  young men were dying 
each year. I left the auditorium and found a deserted men's room. I sat on the floor and cried 
for over an hour, just sobbing. The only time in my life I've reacted to something like that. 
And there were words that kept coming through my head. Words that his action had put in 
my head. The first sentence was, We are eating our young. We are consuming them whether in the 
jungles or on the barricades. 
And I thought of  a line from a song by Leonard Cohen, “Dress Rehearsal Rag.” The line 
was: “So it’s come to this. And wasn’t it a long way down. Ah, wasn’t it a strange way down.”
And I was thinking, My country has come to this. That the best thing a young man can do is go to prison.
And then I thought – and these were the words he put in my head, the words that changed 
my life – What can I do to help end this war, if  I’m ready to go to prison?78
 The man I’ve quoted here is Daniel Ellsberg, who went on to make copies of  and distribute 
what later became known as the Pentagon Papers – a secret history, commissioned internally by the 
Department of  Defense, of  the United States government’s ignoble conduct in waging the Vietnam 
War. I’ve quoted his account of  the thought process which lead him to release these papers at such 
length for a number of  reasons. Firstly, I think that it captures perfectly the intimate unity of  
thought and action that I have been alleging thus far; and which Arendt rejects, I think, through 
uncritical subscription to a philosophical tradition that holds, from Plato to Heidegger, that thought 
and action are radically opposed. Kehler’s words and actions made a profound effect on Ellsberg’s 
thought; not necessarily with regard to the Vietnam War (he was already at an antiwar rally), but in 
the sense that they made him reflect on the meaning of  what Kehler was doing, and that those 
reflections led him in turn to act in a way that he never would have done otherwise. 
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 But moreover, I think Ellsberg’s story is a powerful validation of  Arendt’s account of  action 
in general. Of  the pleasure and sense of  meaning that comes from acting politically.79 Of  the 
intertwinedness of  word and deed. Of  the unpredictability of  action’s effects in the world, and its 
transcendence of  the categories “means” and “ends.”80 Of  how to act means to start something 
new, which was not even a possibility before. And that there is something in “the shining glory of  
great deeds” which shatters the grip of  common sense on our world, of  what we previously thought 
was possible, which makes us think, and which in turn leads us to act in ways of  which we would 
otherwise be incapable. 
Randy Kehler never thought his going to prison would end the war. If  I hadn't met Randy 
Kehler it wouldn't have occurred to me to copy those papers. His actions spoke to me as no 
mere words would have done. He put the right question in my mind at the right time.81
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Interlude
 So where do we stand in making sense of  Arendt’s account of  action? Admittedly, we have 
made some progress. The idea that thinking opens up new possibilities for action – or, to put it 
differently, makes action possible – is surely given some credence by Ellsberg’s account of  his own 
experience in action, as are the ideas that action both transcends means and ends and generates 
meaning. But in other ways our account thus far has been manifestly deficient. Does an action 
undertaken with a certain end in mind – as Ellsberg’s certainly was – truly “transcend” its end 
because it is undertaken with no hope of  accomplishing it?82 And why is starting something “new,” 
for Arendt, so close to action’s essence? Does one act only in blind opposition to tradition, and fail 
to act simply because what one does has been done before? This is an absurd proposition, especially 
since action would then seem to cut off  potentialities for action in the future – once an act has been 
“done,” all acts inspired by that original action are merely derivative in character, and thus not 
properly “acts” at all. What’s more, this account casts action as an at least potentially solipsistic 
activity, which is in clear contradiction to both Arendt’s characterization– a “we” changing a 
“common world” – and in how the phenomenon has presented itself  in Ellsberg’s account. For 
Ellsberg never truly acted alone; he had accomplices even in leaking the Pentagon Papers; and 
furthermore, his aim was one undertaken for the sake of  the political community, an aspect that is 
totally incidental to action in our account. Finally, we have given no account of  action’s relation to 
freedom, though Arendt manifestly states that “to be free and to act are the same.”83 Again, we can 
imagine Ellsberg “feeling free” in his action – but this tells us nothing, especially since Arendt states 
(and seems correct in stating) that the “inner feeling” of  freedom which “remains without outer 
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manifestations” is “politically irrelevant.”84 Thus, we are left with no inkling of  the freedom 
belonging to political action qua action. 
 This last point – the question of  “freedom” – in particular points the way towards which our 
analysis must now proceed. Arendt’s account of  freedom, and thus of  action, is both deeply 
indebted to and a profound repudiation of  the notion of  freedom presented by Martin Heidegger. 
Furthermore, Arendt’s account of  “the world of  appearances” in The Life of  the Mind is also an 
essentially derivative account of  Heidegger’s account of  “worldhood” – though as we shall see later, 
Arendt’s conception of  the world is also a critical response to Heidegger’s, particularly in The Human 
Condition. Thus, I shall now proceed to explicate Heidegger’s account of  Being-in-the-World as the 
essential state of  human existence. If  I succeed in explicating his account (which is by no means a 
given; Bertrand Russell once diplomatically described Heidegger’s terminology as “highly eccentric,” 
adding that “One cannot help suspecting that language is here running riot.”85), then Arendt’s 
account should become clearer in itself; furthermore, we will then be adequately situated to 
appreciate Arendt’s critique of  Heidegger’s philosophy. 
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II. Being-in-the-World
 Martin Heidegger devoted virtually the entirety of  his philosophical career to answering a 
single question: what does it mean to be? Ontology – the study of  being – and metaphysics have 
both generally been oriented towards categorizing entities in the world; a classic ontological 
distinction is that between things that exist in time (e.g. human beings) and outside of  time (God, 
the Forms, etc.). Heidegger, on the other hand, thought that this concern with beings conceals a 
more fundamental question: what is it on the virtue of  which beings are in the first place, what does 
it mean for something to be? One encounters an obvious problem as soon as one attempts to answer 
this question; for in saying “Being is…” one already presupposes an understanding of  what it means 
to be, which is what one is supposed to be explaining. Heidegger did not think of  this difficulty as 
insurmountable, however, and the question of  Being (the “to be,” the act of  Being, as opposed to 
“being” as a noun) oriented his thinking from Being and Time until his death. 
 Any discussion of  Heidegger’s philosophy is bound to become perplexing if  one does not 
keep in mind one key fact. In inquiring into Being, Heidegger takes man as the object of  his inquiry 
– or, to use Heidegger’s terminology, “Dasein” (which literally means “Being-there” and can also be 
translated as “presence,” though “human being” is probably the best translation for our purposes). 
The justification Heidegger presents at the outset of  Being and Time for inquiring into Being this way 
is that Dasein’s Being is an issue for itself  – that we, as human beings, care about our existence and 
what it means to exist. This reason doesn’t make very much sense in itself, and in reality Heidegger is 
holding out on the reader.  The real reason is that Heidegger goes on to claim that Being is 
something only Dasein86 possesses – which, on the face of  it, doesn’t make very much sense either, 
but begins to once one grasps what Heidegger means by “Being.”87 The fact that Heidegger’s 
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ontological inquiry occurs from the standpoint of  Dasein, and that “the question of  Being” is really 
something akin to “what does it mean to exist?” or even “what is the meaning of  life?”, clarifies 
many aspects of  Heidegger’s philosophy which are otherwise somewhat puzzling, such as his 
treatment of  topics which might seem more relevant to psychology than ontology (Dasein’s “state-
of-mind”) and his fundamental contention that entities’ way of  Being depends on their relationship 
to Dasein. 
Heidegger contra Descartes
 The best way to grasp Heidegger’s philosophy is to juxtapose it against the traditional 
understanding of  how humans encounter the world, which has its most straightforward modern 
representative in Descartes. The standard Cartesian model of  knowing the universe is that of  man as 
thinking a subject – the cogito ergo sum. This subject relates itself  through mental representations to 
the surrounding world, which is made up of  various objects. These objects are in turn defined by 
their properties; the door to my room, for example, is made of  wood, painted white, and has a 
metallic doorknob. The wood, paint, and metal doorknob have certain molecular structures that can 
be subjected to further analysis, and so on and so forth. The way of  Being belonging to objects 
might also be called the way of  Being of  “substances,” and is, again, I think a very common-sense 
way of  understanding how human beings operate and the nature of  things that exist. Even other 
human beings, most of  us would be inclined to say, basically exist as things with certain physical 
properties which are independent of  any subject perceiving them. Heidegger has a term for this way 
of  Being, which he calls “presence-at-hand,” and his description essentially corresponds to what I 
have described thus far – with one essential difference. Heidegger, as it turns out, thinks that 
presence-at-hand is not the basic way in which things exist; that encountering things as present-at-
hand is not our primary way of  engaging with the world. 
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 According to Heidegger, there are actually three ways in which things can be in the world.88 
One of  these is presence-at-hand, which I have already described. Our more basic way of  
encountering things in the world, Heidegger says, is to encounter them as equipment, or as what he 
calls the “ready-to-hand.” The basic idea here is that our fundamental way of  encountering things in 
the world is to use them, to consider them in terms of  our possibilities for action. Thus, while I can 
treat a door in the detached, “objective” manner described above, this would actually be a somewhat 
unusual way for the door to enter into my world; a much more ordinary way is to encounter the 
door by using it – as a door.
 The idea that readiness-to-hand is somehow more basic than presence-at-hand seems 
counterintuitive at first – even ludicrous – but is actually quite plausible. Consider this: how many 
times have you used a door today? Presuming that you have left your house – and even if  you 
haven’t – the answer is probably more times than you can count. Now consider this: how many 
times today have you objectively taken stock of  the door’s properties as something present-at-hand? 
I have personally done this once today – when I was writing the paragraph on Descartes – but a 
much more typical answer I think would be something like zero.  Thus, Heidegger seems to have a 
point in considering presence-at-hand to be a somewhat more peculiar and less basic way of  
encountering things in the world than that of  equipment. 
 The third and final way of  Being, as one might have already suspected, is that of  human 
beings – Dasein. Dasein’s way of  Being is what Heidegger calls Being-in-the-world, which “amounts 
to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the 
readiness-to-hand of  a totality of  equipment.”89 This, of  course, sounds like an instance of  what 
Russell would call “language running riot,” but can be made sensible if  we take it apart into its 
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hand and equipment have nothing to contribute as ontological clues in Interpreting the primitive world,” he writes, 
though “certainly the ontology of  Thinghood [substances] does even less.” See Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie 
and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 113.
89 Being and Time, 107.
elements. “Non-thematic” essentially means “non-theoretical” – we don’t have to understand 
anything about Being-in-the-world or read Heidegger to be in the world, we just are. Furthermore, 
when we use things in the world, we are for the most part not concerned with the things we are 
using, but rather what we are using them for.90 “Circumspective” refers to a kind of  “sight” that goes 
along with using equipment – I can in a way “see” what will happen if  I step on the gas pedal in my 
car, for example (though it is important to note that Heidegger is using “sight” metaphorically – 
there is no need for me to actually mentally visualize what will happen in this instance). The idea of  
a “totality of  equipment” is that anything we use and encounter in the world only makes sense in the 
context of  a greater totality of  meaningful things – the notion of  a “car” only makes sense in 
relation to “roads” and “places to go” and “gas stations,” etc. The “world” is both this totality and 
the condition for having such a totality of  meanings. Finally, we are for the most part “absorbed” in 
this world; this again gets at the idea that we don’t need to think about things in the world to use 
them, but also that in not thinking about them we tend to take for granted our system of  meanings 
– our world – as it is. 
 Aside from things like “cars” and “doors,” we make use of  all sorts of  somewhat more 
abstract concepts in our everyday, absorbed dealings with the world as well.91 The notion of  
“professor,” for example, does not make sense outside of  a referential totality of  other concepts – 
“students,” “college,” “classes,” “tenure,” etc. Concepts like this make it possible to go about our 
daily affairs without much thought. Students, for example, go to class as part of  a routine, and they 
are not amazed when the professor stands at the front of  a classroom and starts lecturing, because 
they have an understanding of  what professors do and how other things – students, lecterns, etc. – 
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90 “That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which 
we concern ourselves primarily is the work… The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment 
is encountered.” Ibid, 99. 
91 “When we are one another in public, our everyday concern does not encounter just equipment and work; it likewise 
encounters what is ‘given’ along with these: ‘affairs’, undertakings, incidents, mishaps.” Ibid, 439. 
fit into this activity. On the contrary, this all seems very normal to them, and to us, because we are 
absorbed and feel at home in the world.
The “They”
 One of  the consequences of  inhabiting a common world in the way Heidegger describes is 
that, to put it simply, people generally do things in pretty much the same way. This reason for this, 
according to Heidegger, is that the meaning of  things in the world is constituted by their relation to 
Dasein’s possibilities for action. Thus, the meaning of  a door is tied up in its opening and closing 
(and even more fundamentally, in the reasons for the sake of  which I open and close it), and the 
meaning of  “student” is prescribed by the potentialities for action tied up in being a student – going 
to class, writing papers, etc. But despite the fact that that these potentialities for action are always my 
own – it is always me who acts, never the door – there is a way in which these meanings tend to 
prescribe action for me rather than the other way around. In being a student, for example, the 
activities which go along with being a student become routine for me – to the point where I may be 
going to class and doing work simply because I am a student, having lost sight of  that for the sake of  which 
I am a student in the first place, which is ultimately tied up in my care for myself.92 Thus, because for 
the most part our possibilities are prescribed for us by the common world we inhabit, we all tend 
towards the same potentialities for action. Moreover, because for the most part I am what I do (in 
terms of  my involvements, etc), I am for the most part not myself  in my everyday dealings with the 
world. 
 This might seem an odd claim to make on Heidegger’s part, but if  one follows along with 
him – insofar as what I do is generally prescribed by my common world, that I am for the most part 
what I do, and that even my mental processes and sense of  identity for the most part draw upon this 
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92 According to Heidegger, “care” – for myself, for other Dasein, for things in the world – is the essential aspect of  
Dasein’s Being that defines it in contradistinction to the Being of  any other sort of  entity; what makes me human is the 
fact that I care about my world and the things contained therein.
common world (I am a student, a left-winger, a heterosexual male who plays guitar, etc.) – then I 
would suggest that there is a certain plausibility to his account. The question remains, however: who 
am I then, if  for the most part I am not myself ? Heidegger’s answer to this question is “das Man.”93
 According to Heidegger, Dasein is, for the most part, not itself  in its everyday dealings with 
the world – rather, it is the “they-self.” What this means, essentially, is that for the most part I do 
what “they” do – or, in more idiomatic English, what “everyone” does. I read the newspaper as 
“everyone” does; I dress, at least to a certain extent, the way “everyone” dresses (or at the very least, 
avoid dressing in a way that no one does); I use equipment and follow certain societal rules just like 
“everyone” else. Moreover, I don’t consciously think of  myself  as conforming in this way – and it is 
in this “inconspicuousness and unanswerability” that “the real dictatorship of  the ‘they’ is 
unfolded.” Heidegger continues: “We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we 
read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 
‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find shocking what they find shocking.”94 The second to last 
point here – about the “great mass” – is especially important. According to Heidegger, even the urge 
to appear as if  one is not conforming is a tendency of  the they-self; because, in a peculiar way, this 
would make me stand out, and that is precisely what the they-self  wants to avoid. 
 In everyday life, Heidegger writes, “there is constant care as to the way one differs”95 from 
others – and moreover, not from definite others, but from “the others” in the abstract. “One 
belongs to the Others oneself,” Heidegger writes, “and enhances their power.”96 We orient ourselves 
in our action and appearance with regard to the “averageness” of  the they, and thus “level down” 
32
93 Translating das Man is a contentious issue among Heidegger scholars. Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as “the 
they,” but others, including Herbert Dreyfus, have argued that “the one” is a better translation. The basic idea seems to 
be that in German you can say “das Man does so and so” in much the same way that in English we say “they say that it’s 
going to be a harsh winter” or “one does not talk loudly in the library.” The objection to using “the they” is that for 
Heidegger das Man is a constitutive part of  any individual Dasein’s existence – it’s a part of  one’s self, not something 
belonging to other people. I prefer “the they,” however, as it seems to get across the idea that das Man is the element of  
the self  that is concerned with what other people are doing – “the One” doesn’t really seem to suggest this.
94 Being and Time, 164.
95 Ibid, 163.
96 Ibid, 164.
the possibilities of  our Being. In conceptualizing what this “leveling down” means, it might help to 
consider the following. At any given moment in my life, there is a truly immense number of  things I 
might choose to do. I might go for a swim, I might drive my car through a cornfield, I might jump 
off  a cliff, I might go to class wearing lipstick, and so on. But in reality, I almost certainly will not 
choose to do any of  these things. Some of  these options – jumping off  a cliff, for example – 
probably just hold no appeal to me; but others – wearing lipstick to class, perhaps – might strike me 
as attractive options were I not concerned with what “they” might think. Thus, the otherwise 
staggeringly large number of  actions available to me is “leveled down” by the they. 
 As a result of  this leveling down, Dasein is “disburdened” of  responsibility by the “they,” 
and “the ‘they’ accommodates Dasein if  Dasein has any tendency to take things easily and make 
them easy.”97 The “correct” course of  action in any remotely familiar situation has already been 
prescribed by the “they,” – and moreover, the way we interpret any situation, and the world in 
general, is prescribed in the same way (thus, we might interpret situations which are truly unfamiliar 
as being akin to ones we have experienced before, and respond accordingly). If  two cars stop at an 
intersection at the same time, the car on the right has the right of  way. If  one sees a beggar on the 
side of  the road, there is no need to give him change or even acknowledge his presence. And though 
one could almost certainly furnish reasons for both of  these courses of  action, they would just as 
certainly be superfluous to the real explanation; that this is simply what “they” do. 
 As long as Dasein’s self  has been taken over by the they-self, Heidegger says, Dasein is being 
“inauthentic.” Etymologically, the German word for “authenticity” literally means “one’s own”; and 
thus to be “authentic” is essentially related to recognizing “one’s own” potentialities for action, 
instead of  letting those potentialities be dictated by one’s common world. But it’s not, on the face of 
it, obvious how one can go about acting in an “authentic” manner. As we previously noted, the 
wholesale rejection of  established standards of  conduct does not free oneself  from the “they”; for 
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by doing the opposite of  what is conventionally prescribed, one is (ironically) still taking cues from 
those established standards. Moreover, movements that reject convention in this way and value 
“authenticity” have a tendency to establish their own quite rigid standards for what counts as being 
“authentic.”98 Authenticity, then, is not possible as a withdrawal from the world or as a rejection of  
established standards; instead, authenticity must be understood as a way of  seizing upon and 
appropriating things in the world in a way that makes them one’s own. 
Truth, Freedom, and Resoluteness
 To understand how this can be possible, it is necessary to make a detour into Heidegger’s 
conception of  truth – which will undoubtedly seem something of  a non sequitur, but which will 
seem less so once it is made clear how Heidegger’s notion of  truth differs radically from our 
common sense understanding thereof. Truth, as we typically understand it, lies in the accordance of  
a proposition with its object; I say “the table is round,” and the truth-value of  my sentence depends 
upon whether the table is, in fact, round or not. But for Heidegger, this answer is insufficient. 
“Wherein,” he asks, “are the thing and the statement supposed to be in accordance, considering that 
[they] are manifestly different in their outward appearance?”99 This is a question that is tempting to 
dismiss out of  hand in irritation; not because it is invalid; but on the contrary, because it seems 
perfectly valid and yet impossible to answer. Yet Heidegger, quite characteristically, is not deterred by 
this seeming impossibility. Truth as “adequatio rei ad intellectum,” he writes, can be traced back to “the 
Christian theological belief  that, with respect to what it is and whether it is, a matter, as created, is 
only insofar as it corresponds to the idea preconceived in the intellectus divinus, i.e., in the mind of  
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98 The hippie and punk movements, for example, both ostensibly prized “being yourself,” but within a short time 
established certain prescribed standards of  style, language, etc. The rapidity with which this transformation occurred in 
the latter case is evidenced in a 1978(!) single from the Television Personalities: “I think it's a shame / That they all look 
the same / Here they come / la la la la la la / The part time punks!” 
99 Heidegger, “On the Essence of  Truth” in Basic Writings (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 120. 
God… and in this sense is ‘true.’100 Thus, in a manner reminiscent of  Plato’s Forms, each thing in 
the world has a sort of  correspondence in the world of  ideas; God first conceived the idea of  a 
“tree” and then created trees themselves, and we can thus judge the statement “this is a tree” by 
whether the thing indicated corresponds to the idea of  a tree, the statement “the tree is green” by 
whether the tree corresponds to the idea of  “greenness,” and so on. Furthermore, we can see that 
statements relate themselves to things in the world by “presenting” those things and by saying how 
they are “disposed”101 – I say “tree” and evoke the image of  a tree, and by saying that it is “green” I 
refine that image. 
 The inadequacy of  the adequatio rei ad intellectum, then, and with the correspondence theory of  
truth in general, is that once we abandon the notion that things in the world have some sort of  built-
in correspondence with the ideas of  a creator-god or the Forms, one half  of  the correspondence 
relationship – what things in the world are supposed to correspond to – becomes problematic. The 
possibility of  such a relationship becomes dependent upon the disclosing of  ideas or meanings to 
which things in the world can correspond – which amounts to the disclosure of  “beings” or 
“entities” themselves, for without a system of  discrete meanings the world would appear only as an 
undifferentiated mass.102 Thus it is this disclosing, Heidegger writes, that makes possible the adequatio 
rei ad intellectum, and which “must with more original right be taken as the essence of  truth.”103 
 But what, then, are we to say about this original disclosing? According to Heidegger, the 
essence of  this disclosing, and therefore of  truth, is freedom.104 Heidegger writes: 
Freedom is not merely what common sense is content to let pass under this name: the 
caprice, turning up occasionally in our choosing, of  inclining in this or that direction. 
Freedom is not mere absence of  constraint with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor is 




102 Though perhaps even this says too much; without a world of  meaning, it is questionable whether anything would 
“appear” at all. Perhaps it is safer to say, with Richard Rorty, that “something” would still be “there,” and nothing more.
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid, 123.
(“negative” and “positive” freedom), freedom is engagement in the disclosure of  beings as 
such.105
This understanding of  freedom seems so alien to our commonsense understanding thereof  that it is 
tempting to conclude that he is just talking about something else entirely. But Heidegger suggests 
that what he describes is somehow “prior” to, and thus forms the basis of, our common 
understanding. How can this be? 
 The answer to this question lies in Heidegger’s definition of  meaning in terms of  my 
possibilities for action – as the “upon-which of  a projection [of  my possibilities] in terms of  which 
something becomes intelligible as something.”106 Or as Gertrude Stein once said: “A difference, to 
be a difference, must make a difference.” The point here is that any disclosure of  meaning, any 
categorical distinction (which amounts to the same thing) must necessarily tell me something about 
my possibilities for action – or at the very least, about man’s possibilities for action in some 
conceivable situation.107 But the practical upshot of  this point is that anything I do, and moreover my 
ability to do anything in the first place, is necessarily dependent upon this prior disclosure of  
meaning (Lee Harvey Oswald, for example, could not have shot John F. Kennedy without a 
disclosed “aim” in doing so, as well as a whole series of  more “nitty-gritty” disclosures; “rifles,” 
“grassy knolls,” etc.).
 My ability to be “free” then, insofar is it is understood as more than “doing what one 
likes,” (a view ascribed by Aristotle to “those who do not know what freedom is”108), is dependent 
upon my ability to disclose possibilities through meaning. This freedom is only possible “if  we refrain 
from premature categorizations of  what appears”109 – if  we “let beings be” by drawing our 
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107 Even the most abstract scientific discoveries, I would argue, are only “meaningful” in this way. At the very least, they 
further our aim to understand and appreciate the universe as it is; moreover, scientific discoveries frequently yield 
practical applications that are not apparent at the time they are made, and even discoveries about phenomena in the far 
reaches of  space could conceivably prove indispensable in the event that we set out to colonize another planet.
108 “What is Freedom?” in Between Past and Future, 146.
109 Peter McInerney, Time and Experience (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 119.
categories and meanings from the phenomena themselves (“To the things themselves!” as Husserl 
said), rather than letting the world appear to us through our pre-drawn categories. For the most part, 
Dasein – under the dictatorship of  the “they” – “acquiesces in this or that being and its particular 
openedness [disclosure],” Heidegger writes, and thus “clings to what is readily available and 
controllable even where ultimate matters are concerned.” The they-self, then, is not really free (or 
rather, is constantly fleeing from its freedom); for its possibilities for action have already been 
disclosed by the public world, and its ability to disclose new possibilities has been closed off. 
“Freedom,” by contrast, “is the resolutely open bearing that does not close up in itself,”110 and to be 
free is to suspend one’s categorizations and “learn to exist in the nameless,”111 such that we may see 
the world with fresh eyes and disclose new possibilities for Being.
Freedom and Action
 So where has our digression into Heidegger’s phenomenology taken us in our understanding 
of  Arendt and her conception of  political action? Perhaps the most obvious link at this point 
between the work of  the two thinkers is the resemblance of  Heidegger’s das Man to Arendt’s notion 
of  the “the social” in The Human Condition, which I will discuss in Part III. But it is Heidegger’s 
understanding of  truth and freedom as “disclosure” that, I think, is of  particularly immense value in 
understanding what Arendt is doing in The Human Condition and beyond. 
 Firstly, Arendt’s reevaluation of  the vita activa is clearly an attempt to apply the 
phenomenological method – the suspension of  one’s existing categories of  meaning – to politics, 
and it is this unique combination of  method and object that makes her work so fascinating and, at 
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times, befuddling to interpreters.112 But what are we to make of  the inconsistencies between 
Heidegger’s account of  truth and her own, which singles out Heidegger as one of  the prime 
offenders in failing to distinguish between “truth” and “meaning?”113 In a way, the accounts of  both 
thinkers make room for such disagreement. For Heidegger, there is no “final disclosure” which 
could ever say everything there is to say or be the only way of  saying it; no statement that could ever 
grasp a thing in the entirety of  its Being and thus make it “relinquish itself  entirely.”114 Likewise, 
truth for Arendt is a property of  statements about the world and not of  a statement’s component 
meanings; thus, though she argues that we should see a distinction between truth and meaning, she 
would not presumably say that Heidegger’s terminology is “untrue.” As a result, we can see both 
Arendt’s frequent reproaches against other thinkers for failing to make certain distinctions – 
between “authority” and “power” and “force,” for example115 – as well as Heidegger’s similar 
diatribes as being done with a knowing wink, with a tacit acknowledgement that “all refutation in the 
field of  essential thinking” – thinking that discloses the “essences” or “meanings” of  worldly things 
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112 See, for example, Hanna Pitkin’s essay Are Freedom and Liberty Twins?, which approaches Arendt’s distinction thereof  in 
a way that is fundamentally alien to her methodology. Not that this is by any means bad; on the contrary, it is the 
collision of  different “worlds” in this manner that produces some of  the most interesting insights in philosophy and 
political theory. 
113 See Thinking, 15. 
114 “On the Essence of  Truth” in Basic Writings, 121. Note that Heidegger’s position, which characterizes truth as neither 
objective nor subjective (see Being and Time, 270) is by no means the same as that of  Richard Rorty, who claims that truth 
is only a property of  statements about the world and that there is no criterion by which to distinguish between 
vocabularies (systems of  meaning) aside from their usefulness. Though this stance is to some extent reconcilable with 
Heidegger and Arendt’s in the way I am attempting to reconcile the latter two here, Rorty’s account is, I think, 
significantly more radical in its subjectivism than either of  these two thinkers would be comfortable with.
115 See “What is Authority?” in Between Past and Future. Note, however, on page 95, where Arendt both emphasizes her 
“conviction of  the importance of  making distinctions,” yet castigates the right of  thinkers “to retreat into our own 
worlds of  meaning, and demand only that each of  us remain consistent within his own private terminology,” on the 
grounds that such a right entails that “If… we assure ourselves that we still understand each other, we do not mean that 
together we understand a world common to us all, but that we understand the consistency arguing and reasoning, of  the 
process of  argumentation in its sheer formality.” This statement seems in tension, not only with her later contention that 
the “meanings” of  things are not in themselves true or false, but with her entire body of  work, which largely consists of  
defining words in ways that often differ wildly from our common understanding thereof  (her definition of  “power” 
being a prime example). The best way, I think, to understand Arendt’s point here is to take her as saying that 1. Words 
have certain meanings in everyday usage which cannot be entirely passed over in “defining one’s terms,” 2. One can, in 
defining terms, be more or less true to the phenomena being described, and 3. An unrestricted right of  redefinition leads 
to the devaluation of  language and the loss of  a common world, and thus any substantive argument must consider 
whether one’s definitions of  terms are appropriate or, on the contrary, somehow distort the phenomena they refer to. 
Altogether then, a somewhat more Heideggerian position than the one she adopts in The Life of  the Mind.
– “is foolish… a lover’s quarrel’ concerning the matter itself.”116 We can then understand both 
thinkers’ accounts as essentially getting at the same truth, with each having certain strengths and 
weaknesses in this regard.117 
 But returning to the matter that led us to these considerations in the first place, Heidegger’s 
account of  freedom and its relation to truth is also extremely useful in clarifying Arendt’s account of 
action. By interpreting action in terms of  resoluteness – Heidegger’s “resolutely open bearing” towards 
Being118 – we can resolve several of  the quandaries that have plagued us thus far. Action 
“transcends” motives, means and ends in the same way that it transcends the sheer givenness of  the 
world more generally – by disclosing one’s own possibilities, which may or may not have been 
previously disclosed by the common world in which one acts. As Heidegger writes, authentic Dasein 
“does not abandon itself  to that which is past, nor does it aim at progress. In the moment of  vision 
authentic existence is indifferent to both these alternatives”119 – both to slavish conformity and to 
mindless rebellion. Likewise, action begins something new because it is not bound in any way to the 
“innumerable and various rules” that characterize behavior, and thus cannot be predicted by 
reference to (whether for or against) those rules.
 The key distinction to be made between Heidegger’s “freedom” and Arendt’s conception of  
freedom through action, then, is that that the former is exclusively concerned with the internal 
freedom that makes action possible, whereas Arendt (in her political works at least) only considers 
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116 “Letter on Humanism” in Basic Writings, 239. 
117 The utility of  Arendt’s distinction between truth and meaning is, I think, evident from our prior discussion; where it 
perhaps leads us astray, though, is in her contention that meanings – like “enhanced interrogation methods” – cannot in 
themselves be true or false. This may be true in a sense, but it is also manifestly the case that this phrase in particular, 
when taken in relation to the phenomena it is meant to describe, is manifestly designed to conceal more than reveal; 
thus, there is a way in which Heidegger’s definition of  truth allows us to denounce such language as being “untrue” in a 
way that I think is both highly plausible and difficult to account for within Arendt’s framework
118 “Resoluteness” is, in many ways, an awful translation of  the German “entschlossen,” which is etymologically related to 
verschlossen, which means “closed” or “shut up.” The prefix “ent-” means “away from”; thus, Heidegger’s terminology 
emphasizes that one is being resolutely open in comportment. The English translation loses this meaning, and can in fact 
be easily taken as meaning the opposite, as a sort of  “there are no values, so it doesn’t matter what you do, just pick 
something” – a interpretation that, while incorrect, is perhaps understandable in light of  Heidegger’s biography. 
119 Being and Time, 438.
freedom to be meaningful in its expression through worldly action.120 This is by no means an 
unimportant point; but if  we were to halt our analysis here, we would nonetheless understand 
Arendt’s project as something like a quaint modification of  Heidegger’s, an application of  the 
master’s method to a novel object – politics. But to do so would seriously misunderstand Arendt’s 
appropriation of  Heidegger’s philosophy, which is anything but uncritical in nature. Our 
interpretation thus far serves us perfectly well in distinguishing between action and behavior; 
Eichmann, to return to one of  our previous examples, was clearly behaving under the dictatorship 
of  the “they,” and was in no way engaged in the disclosure of  his own possibilities. But how does 
Arendt’s account of  action stand in relation to the man who established the rules to which Eichmann 
felt bound to conform; the man who disclosed those possibilities in the first place?
 To invoke Adolf  Hitler has long been one of  those clichéd rhetorical strategies that almost 
always does more harm than good in furthering a discussion; nonetheless, in this case I feel the 
question to be entirely appropriate: can Hitler really be said to exemplify “behaving” man in the 
same way as Eichmann? The answer here, I think, is an unequivocal no. On the contrary, Hitler’s 
“final solution” to the “Jewish problem” redefined what we thought possible from humanity; the 
Holocaust, “in its naked monstrosity,” Arendt once said, “seemed not only to me but to many others 
to transcend all moral categories and to explode all standards of  jurisdiction.”121 Are we obliged, 
then, to recognize Hitler as a sort of  inverse Eichmann, as a man of  action par excellence? 
 The answer on this point is more equivocal, and in fact hinges on a sort of  ambiguity in 
Arendt’s account of  action. If  we take action merely in contradistinction to behavior, as “the 
freedom to call something into being which did not exist before,”122 then it seems as if  we are 
obliged to respond in the affirmative. Arendt herself  seems to imply this when she includes fear, 
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121 “Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship” in Responsibility and Judgement, 23. 
122 “What is Freedom?” in Between Past and Future, 150. 
distrust, and hatred among the “principles” that may be made manifest through action,123 as well as 
when she speaks of  freedom and action as “the twofold gift” which allows men to “establish a 
reality of  their own” (surely one could find no better description for what Hitler accomplished in 
Nazi Germany). But in other places, this is not all that action entails; indeed, in the same essay 
Arendt writes that “political institutions… depend for continued existence upon acting men,”124 and 
that “if  we understand the political in the sense of  the polis, its end or raison d'être would be to 
establish and keep in existence a space where freedom… can appear.”125 Earlier, this statement 
seemed a sort of  perversion of  the true nature of  politics; now, I think, it has taken on an almost 
ethical significance. Arendt herself  would probably not view The Human Condition – or any of  her 
other works for that matter – as ethical projects; indeed, in her lecture “Some Questions of  Moral 
Philosophy,” Arendt argues against the existence of  “objective” moral values as they are traditionally 
understood.126 But that does not mean her work is entirely lacking a moral element. Even Nietzsche, 
that famed “immoralist,” once wrote of  Lou Salome that “She told me that she had no morality – 
and I thought that she had, like myself, a more severe morality”127; and any work that sets up 
something like action as “an end in itself ” is necessarily moral, at least in this “more severe” sense. 
Hence, we must now go beyond our discussion of  action as it now stands to discuss this other sense 
in which Arendt conceives of  action; wherein lies her critique of  Heideggerian philosophy. 
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127 See “Draft of  a Letter to Paul Rée” in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1953), 
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III. The World as Arena for Action
 
 In giving a lecture on Division I of  Being and Time, Hubert Dreyfus once related an 
encounter with a French professor who characterized the philosophy of  Jean-Paul Sartre as “a 
brilliant misunderstanding” of  Heidegger’s work.128 This is an apt characterization for many reasons, 
perhaps foremost among them the way Sartre and Heidegger approach the issue of  human 
subjectivity. Existentialism, Sartre writes, is the doctrine that “existence proceeds essence” – a 
statement drawn from Being and Time – “or, if  you will, that we must begin from the subjective.”129 
The fact that Sartre included Heidegger among the “existentialists” in this sense prompted the latter 
to write a lengthy response titled “Letter on Humanism,” in which he declared, among other things, 
that this “basic tenet of  existentialism has nothing at all in common with the statement from Being 
and Time.”130 And setting aside what exactly Heidegger did mean by saying that “existence precedes 
essence,” which is not at all obvious, it is clear enough from what we have already said that he was 
certainly not a Cartesian in the way of  Sartre. In “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger writes that 
“subject” and “object” are “inappropriate terms of  metaphysics, which very early on in the form of  
Occidental ‘logic’ and ‘grammar’ seized control of  the interpretation of  language.”131 Dasein, 
Heidegger writes, does not relate to the world as a subject knowing objects; if  anything, Dasein as 
Being-in-the-world is the commercium, or intercourse, “between a subject present-at-hand and an 
And where do all these highways go, now that we are free?
-Leonard Cohen 
42
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129 See Existentialism is a Humanism, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm
130 “Letter on Humanism” in Basic Writings, 232. 
131 Ibid, 218.
Object present-at-hand”132 which allows such a relationship to exist in the first place.133 Most 
importantly, Dasein cannot possibly exist as a “free-floating,” Cartesian subject; it presupposes the 
existence of  both a world and the other Dasein who inhabit it. “The world,” Heidegger writes, “is 
always the one that I share with Others.”134 In this way, Heidegger avoids the extreme subjectivity of 
Sartre’s account, and captures the essential fact that my existence is structured largely by my co-
existence with other people.
 Or does he? Certainly, Heidegger asserts this bare fact multiple times over the course of  
Being and Time; but is it reflected in the substance of  his analysis? Sartre, Cartesianism 
notwithstanding, devotes large swaths of  Being and Nothingness to the relations of  l’être-pour-soi to 
others. By contrast, Heidegger first discusses Dasein’s “Being-with” in chapter IV of  Division I – 
the shortest chapter in the whole book, taking up a mere seventeen pages in the original German – 
and moreover, this discussion is directed primarily towards determining the “self ” that “Dasein is in 
its everydayness.”135 Here, Heidegger makes the following points: that in encountering equipment in 
the world, we also become aware of  the existence of  other Dasein;136 that in dealing with “the 
Other,” we can “leap in” for him and take away his care, leaving him “dominated and 
dependent,”137or we can “leap ahead” of  him and thus give his care “back to him authentically… for 
the first time”; and finally, that in its everyday dealings Dasein is “proximally and for the most part” 
not its authentic self, but is rather taken over by the “they.”
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133 Heidegger, I think, is being a bit pedantic though. From a phenomenal perspective, Being-in-the-world does seem to 
capture our experience as conscious beings better than the Cartesian subject-object relationship; one the features that 
comes along with such an existence, however, is the ability to adopt a third-person, alienated perspective in conceiving of 
the world, to which a subject-object relationship seems to correspond rather well. The first perspective may be more 
primal and, indeed, the condition of  the first, but that does not rob the second perspective entirely of  its worth, nor 
make its “refutation” any less “foolish.”




 Heidegger’s analysis of  “the Other” through Being and Time consists essentially of  
refinements upon these basic points until we reach Division II, section 74, where Heidegger 
discusses Dasein’s “historizing” – which, for our purposes, can be taken to mean how Dasein, 
stretching itself  along through time, comes to understand itself  essentially as the temporally-
continuous subject of  a life story. Heidegger writes: 
“But if  fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with-Others, its 
historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny. This is how we designate 
the historizing of  the community, of  a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself  
together out of  individuals’ fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived 
as the occurring together of  several Subjects. Our fates have already been guided in advance, 
in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite 
possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of  destiny become 
free. Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full authentic 
historizing of  Dasein.138
Such a confusing passage would potentially yield multiple interpretations – perhaps, for example, we 
could understand “communicating and struggling” as entailing some sort of  democratic agonism – 
if  Heidegger had not already made clear his views on democracy and politics in general. I have 
avoided discussing Heidegger’s support for National Socialism thus far because it is, I think, 
considerably less relevant to most aspects of  his philosophy than, say, Thomas Jefferson’s ownership 
of  slaves is to his political writings. Here, however, it seems impossible to resolve such an 
ambiguously worded passage without appeal to biographical evidence. To that end, we may consult 
the recollections of  Karl Löwith, a former student of  Heidegger, concerning an encounter between 
the two thinkers in 1936. 
I turned the conversation to the controversy in the Neue Zuricher Zeitung and explained that I 
agreed neither with Barth's political attack [on Heidegger] nor with Staiger's defense, insofar 
as I was of  the opinion that his partisanship for National Socialism lay in the essence of  his 
philosophy. Heidegger agreed with me without reservation, and added that his concept of   
"historicity" was the basis of  his political "engagement." He also left no doubt about his 
belief  in Hitler…
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 There seems no reason to doubt, in light of  both Löwith’s account and the passage from 
Being and Time excerpted above, that Heidegger’s concept of  “historicity” did indeed lead him to 
endorse Fascism.139 But why did he come to hold such views in the first place? The answer, I think, 
lies in the fact that Heidegger’s entire analysis of  “Being-with the Other” is inadequate as such, and 
wholly fails to grasp what it means to exist in a community with other people.  
 Perhaps the clearest example of  this deficiency in Heidegger’s thought can be seen in his 
discussion of  guilt in Being and Time. Guilt, as we traditionally understand it, occurs (or at least 
should occur) when one transgresses against a moral imperative; or as Heidegger puts it, “common 
sense… knows only the satisfying of  manipulable rules and public norms and the failure to satisfy 
them.”140 As one might expect, however, Heidegger sees these “public norms” as having nothing to 
do with the authentic phenomenon of  guilt. The true nature of  guilt, Heidegger writes, manifests 
itself  in the mood of  anxiety. Anxiety, on Heidegger’s account, is the experience of  alienation from 
the public world, in which the familiar routines and meanings of  that world become uncanny 
(Unheimlichkeit, literally “not-at-home” – a phrase that occurs in this literal form frequently in 
Arendt’s writing). In this state, the impotence of  these “manipulable rules and public norms” to 
relieve us of  the primordial responsibility we bear for our acts becomes apparent; hence, Dasein is 
always guilty of  having chosen one possibility of  existence over any of  the myriad others available. 
Heidegger thus formally defines guilt as “Being-the-basis of  a nullity.”141 Conscience and guilt, then, 
give no “practical injunctions” or guidelines for action, for in doing so “conscience would deny to 
existence nothing less than the very possibility of  taking action”142; the very possibility of  freedom. 
 In many ways, Heidegger’s analysis here is brilliant. Before we take action, we often seek 
counsel from others on the right course of  action; and even after action has been taken, we often 
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become more significant in this context. See Being and Time, pages 422 and 437.
140 Being and Time, 334.
141 Being and Time 329.
142 Ibid, 340. 
still talk with others, seeking assurance that we “did the right thing.” There is nothing wrong, of  
course, about seeking guidance before making an important decision. What Heidegger points out, 
however, is that all too often this behavior is not an expression of  conscience, of  our earnest desire 
to do the right thing, but rather a flight from conscience and the primordial responsibility we bear for 
our actions. Our terrible fate as human beings is that we want to do the right thing, but have no 
access to any prescriptive code to tell us what that thing might be in any situation. Being authentic, 
however, requires owning up to that fact, rather than attempting to drown our anxiety in the 
reassurances of  others.
 But Heidegger fails to locate the source of  our desire to do the right thing, of  this “wanting 
to have a conscience.”143 For Heidegger, Dasein’s guilt is solely a function of  Dasein’s “Being-the-
basis of  a nullity,” as well as the primordial indebtedness entailed by being “thrown” into the world – 
that Dasein “owes its existence to something that it is not itself.”144 But this is an absurd account of  
the origin of  guilt, for it completely glosses over the fact that guilt is only possible when one’s actions affect 
other people. Is Robinson Crusoe truly “guilty” in any meaningful sense if  he decides to construct his 
hut out of  stone instead of  wood? If  he decides to have coconut milk with his breakfast instead of  
water? Perhaps these types of  decisions do indeed fill some souls with “fear and trembling”; but I 
suspect that Abraham – to use the subject of  Kierkegaard’s essay as an example – would have been 
somewhat less stricken by anxiety if  God had instructed him to lay a slab of  wood upon the altar 
rather than his second son. 
 Arendt herself  uncritically adopts Heidegger’s solipsistic account in her treatment of  
conscience as the “two-in-one” dialogue with oneself, which perhaps explains her bizarre treatment 
46
143 See Ibid, 334.
144 Arendt, Willing, 184. 
of  it as a marginally political, wholly negative phenomenon,145 which we previously discussed.146 For 
Arendt as well as Heidegger, the standard of  conscience “is the self  and not the world”; where 
Arendt rightly takes her leave of  Heidegger’s reasoning, however, is in calling this standard 
“irresponsible.”147 Heidegger is so bound within the binary framework of  authenticity and 
inauthenticity, of  one’s own self  and the “they-self,” that he cannot possibly conceive of  freedom as 
anything but an individual phenomenon; one can at most help others become free through 
“communicating and struggling,” but this freedom remains a property of  the self, an individual cut 
adrift from the public world and the dictates of  the “they.” The only way these alienated selves can 
possibly act in coordination is if  one supposes, with Heidegger, that these individuals in isolation 
will tap into a “common destiny”; that each of  these individuals will miraculously find within 
themselves the same voice calling them to the same potentiality for action. Thus, Arendt is utterly 
correct in calling this a “mechanical reconciliation by which the atomized Selves are provided with a 
common ground that is essentially alien to their nature,” as well as in concluding that this can only 
result in “the organization of  these Selves... into an Over-self  in order somehow to effect a 
transition from resolutely accepted guilt to action.”148
 The irony here, of  course, is that what Heidegger has accomplished is the utter oblivion of  
freedom in freedom’s name; the submersion of  all individual consciences under one will – literally, a 
dictatorship of  the “they” – in the name of  authenticity. Unable to conceive of  how man might live 
“together with his own kind in the world”149 without sacrificing freedom, Heidegger resorts to a sort 
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and myself,” claiming that Heidegger views such a dialogue “as an inauthentic attempt at self  justification against the 
claims of  the ‘Them’” (Ibid, 185). This in spite of  the fact that for Heidegger, authentic conscience manifests itself  as a 
form of  silent discourse (Being and Time, 316), as a “call” from Dasein in its uncanniness (Ibid, 321), and moreover as one 
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as Arendt seems to think that Heidegger speaks elsewhere of  “the voice of  the friend that every Dasein carries with 
it” (Willing, 185), because this is entirely consistent with Heidegger’s account of  conscience as a form of  silent discourse 
which transpires when one listens to one’s authentic self. 
146 See pages 21 and 22 of  this essay. 
147 Responsibility and Judgement, 79.
148 “What is Existential Philosophy?” in Essays in Understanding, 181.
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of  crass mythologizing that would not be out of  place in Plato’s Republic – were it not for the fact 
that the only person duped here is Heidegger himself. Arendt, by contrast, sets out to discover how 
we might “accommodate the modern sense of  alienation in the world and the modern desire to 
create, in a world that is no longer a home to us, a human world that could become our home.”150 
This world, she tells us, is only possible “insomuch as it transcends both the sheer functionalism of  
things produced for consumption and the sheer utility of  objects produced for use.”151 And while 
Heidegger would surely agree on this point, it is Arendt who tells us how this must be done; that “in 
order to be what the world is always meant to be, a home for men during their life on earth, the 
human artifice must be a place fit for action and speech” – a space where men can be free. 
Action and the Disclosure of  the Self
 Our discussion of  Arendt’s conception of  “worldhood” thus far has largely drawn upon The 
Life of  the Mind, and thus has given the impression that her conception is merely a derivative, more 
general version of  Heidegger’s. Such an impression could not be farther from the truth. In fact, 
Arendt’s earlier writings – particularly The Human Condition – present a vision of  worldhood that 
departs radically from Heidegger’s; only later did she come to explicitly reincorporate more of  his 
conception into her own. If  we consult Günter Gaus’ 1964 interview with Arendt, we find the 
following exchange:
ARENDT: I admit that the Jewish people are a classic example of  a worldless people 
maintaining themselves throughout thousands of  years…
GAUS: “World” in the sense of  your terminology as space for politics.
ARENDT: As space for politics. 
And later in the same interview:
ARENDT: I live in the modern world, and obviously my experience is in and of  the modern 
world. This after all, is not controversial. But the matter of  merely laboring and consuming is 
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of  crucial importance for the reason that a kind of  worldlessness defines itself  there too. 
Nobody cares any longer what the world looks like.
GAUS: “World” understood always as the space in which politics can originate.
ARENDT: I comprehend it now in a much larger sense, as the space in which things 
become public, as the space in which one lives and which must look presentable. In which 
art appears, of  course. In which all kinds of  things appear. 
It would be a mistake to conclude from this exchange that Arendt’s conception of  “worldhood” 
prior to 1964 did not incorporate Heideggerian elements. On the contrary, Arendt’s discussion of  
homo faber and the world as “human artifice” in The Human Condition bear distinct traces of  
Heidegger’s philosophy – but here the emphasis is placed on a different aspect of  the world, on its 
purpose as a place “fit for action and speech” (a purpose of  which Heidegger, of  course, had little 
conception152). By the time Arendt wrote The Life of  the Mind in the late seventies, Arendt was 
presenting a conception of  worldhood that more closely resembled Heidegger’s; this does not mean, 
however, that she had abandoned her earlier view. On the contrary, the conception of  worldhood 
she presents in these two works is remarkably consistent; the latter is simply not a predominantly 
political work and thus places no particular emphasis on the world’s political elements. At the time 
she wrote The Human Condition in 1958, however, her intent was precisely to emphasize those aspects 
of  the world, of  which any serious consideration is so clearly lacking in Heidegger’s account.
 The most radical and important contribution Arendt makes to our understanding of  
“worldhood” is her discovery that it is not just the meanings of  equipment and other things that are 
disclosed in the world – people disclose themselves through word and deed in their dealings with 
other persons. It is through speech and action, Arendt writes, that “human beings appear to each 
other, not… as physical objects, but qua men.”153 Indeed, this is such a fundamental element of  
human experience that its passing over by Heidegger is dumbfounding; while it is all well and good 
to point out that pieces of  equipment do not appear to us, for the most part, as mere objects with 
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discernible properties, it seems even more basic to our experience that other persons do not appear to 
us in such a form, but in a mode entirely different from what is either “present-at-hand” or “ready-
to-hand.” Indeed, the meaning of  who a person is defies “all efforts toward unequivocal verbal 
expression” to an even greater extent than the meaning of  concepts like “justice”; “the moment we 
want to say who somebody is,” Arendt writes, “our very vocabulary leads us astray into saying what he 
is… we get entangled in a description of  qualities he necessarily shares with others like him… with 
the result that his specific uniqueness escapes us.”154 Yet this ineffable sense of  personality, our 
understanding of  who the people we deal with in our daily lives are, is just as surely disclosed by and 
known to us as the meaning of  any mere thing in the world. 
 As a result of  this disclosure, “the physical, worldly in-between… is overlaid and, as it were, 
overgrown with an altogether different in-between which consists of  deeds and words and owes its 
origin exclusively to men's acting and speaking directly to one another.”155 This “web” of  human 
relationships, Arendt emphasizes, “is no less real than the world of  things we visibly have in 
common”156 – on the contrary, Arendt seems right to characterize this world of  things as the mere 
stage, as it were, upon which we act out the stories that emerge from human relationships. 
Moreover, just as the disclosure of  worldly things occurs against the backdrop of  an always 
previously existing world of  meaning, speech and action “always fall into an already existing web” of 
stories,157 which constitute an essential element of  our shared cultural world. 
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here as well. Insofar as we view people in terms of  ready-made categories, we are liable to prejudice in our opinions of  
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 But this conception of  disclosure through action amounts to more than just a gloss, albeit a 
very substantial one, on Heidegger’s conception of  “worldhood.” It also amounts to deconstruction 
of  the dichotomy Heidegger establishes between authenticity and inauthenticity, between “one’s 
own” self  and the they-self. For contrary to Heidegger's claim that, for the most part, we are “not 
ourselves” in our everyday dealings in the world, Arendt illustrates that this is plainly absurd; for most 
of  our affairs concern other people who we perceive not as faceless members of  the “they,” but as 
individuals disclosed in their unique human distinctiveness. However bound to convention a person 
may be, no matter how much one may even seek to expunge all traces of  one’s individual character, 
some traces of  that individuality – one’s “qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings,”158 as Arendt 
puts it – will necessarily remain and be disclosed insofar as one acts and speaks.159 
 But that is not to say Arendt rejects Heidegger’s dichotomy completely, of  course; her 
discussion of  “the social” in the Human Condition bears, as many interpreters have noted, marked 
similarities to the “they.”160 Rather, while Heidegger sees authenticity as a rare phenomenon in the 
face of  the tyranny of  the “they,” Arendt conceives of  a framework that is less binary, in which self-
disclosure is an activity “from which no human being can refrain and still be human.”161 But 
moreover, there is an essential continuity between Heidegger’s notion of  authenticity and Arendt’s 
conception of  self-disclosure through action – for in order for the latter to occur, one must be free in 
the Heideggerian sense. Though no person ever succeeds in extinguishing all traces of  their individual 
nature, it is self-evident that persons who do not distinguish themselves through speech or action – 
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There was something that he lacked: discretion, aloofness, a sort of  saving stupidity. You could not say that he was 
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been better unsaid, he had read too many books, he frequented the Chestnut Tree Cafe, haunt of  painters and 
musicians…” (55).
160 With the exception that Arendt emphasizes the social’s historical contingency, while Heidegger characterizes the 
“they” as a constitutive (and presumably transhistorical) factor of  Dasein’s existence.
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but rather tend to behave like everyone else – do not distinguish themselves, though their individuality 
may become apparent if  one takes the time to get to know them “in person,” so to speak. On the 
contrary, it is those who “stand” or “act out” whose distinctiveness is most apparent; and whether 
this manifests itself  in the former (positive) sense or the latter (negative) one, in either case we get a 
sense for who that person is. A person who cannot disclose new meanings, or at least thoughtfully 
determine which categories and meanings are most appropriate to a given situation, is disclosed 
almost as a sort of  non-person, liable to mockery at the hands of  those who perceive this 
“mechanical inelasticity.”162 By contrast, it is those who disclose new meanings and new possibilities 
through speech and action whose distinctiveness is most apparent; to draw an example from popular 
culture, lyrical originality in both style and content is so essential to “standing out” in rap music that 
Lil Wayne goes so far as to claim to be an extra-terrestrial in the song “Phone Home” (“We are not 
the same – I am a Martian”), while Drake declares in “Lord Knows” that “A lot of  niggas came up 
off  a style that I made up / But if  all I hear is me then who should I be afraid of?”163
 The key difference between Arendt and Heidegger’s conception, then, is that Heidegger 
remains trapped within the dichotomy of  an isolated, individual self  and the public at large, with no 
plausible solution for how the former might reintegrate himself  into the world. Arendt, by contrast, 
does not ascribe to this sort of  binary opposition – though at the same time, she does seem to view 
the self-disclosure inherent in speech and action as an increasingly rare occurrence within the 
52
162 In addition to Arendt’s comments on Eichmann in Thinking and “What Remains? The Language Remains,” see Henri 
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163 The rather obvious point here being that by imitating one’s words – the way one discloses meaning through speech –
the imitator himself  also becomes a semblance of  that person. 
political realm.164 Indeed, there does seem to be something disturbing, and perhaps sad, in the fact 
that though we get an intimate sense of  who Lil Wayne is by listening to Tha Carter 3, the exact 
opposite trend is becoming ever more prevalent in the sphere of  politics.165 One might argue, of  
course, that this loss of  disclosure in the public – or at leas political – realm is nothing to mourn 
over; that it is, on the contrary, a sign of  progress in the “science” of  government. But this would be 
missing the point; for in banishing action and disclosure from the public realm, we excise all hope of 
overcoming the Heideggerian dichotomy between the self  and the “they,” by making the political 
arena a space for disclosure and freedom. 
Freedom as Deliberative Democracy
 The substance of  this public – as opposed to private – freedom resides in what Sheldon 
Wolin aptly calls the “political potentialities of  ordinary citizens… with their possibilities for 
becoming political beings through the self-discovery of  common concerns and of  modes of  action 
for realizing them.”166 But what does this mean? We have already characterized action by 
distinguishing it from behavior and determined that the former differs essentially from the latter in 
not being bound to established norms or conventions – which in turn are dependent upon a given 
conceptual framework for conceiving the world. How can this sort of  freedom, which seems 
markedly Heideggerian and individualistic, manifest itself  in public? 
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165 Mitt Romney being the obvious contemporary example, though it seems plain that Barack Obama is just as 
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166 Sheldon Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy” in Constellations Volume 1, No 1, 1994. Page 11
 We might start by noting that all political problems are, at their core, creative in nature. 
There is no truly political question that can be answered through a mechanical operation or 
mathematical formula; even tasks that may require intensive calculations of  this sort, such as writing 
tax policy, cannot be resolved solely by these methods. On the contrary, the tax code must first be 
conceived and then written down like any other creative endeavor. Moreover, this – as well as any other 
political problem – requires at least implicitly answering certain fundamental questions, such as what 
does our group value? and why do we – as a political body, as opposed to discrete individuals – exist? 
When these problems are posed in an individual context, we call them existential questions. When 
they are asked in the context of  a body politic, by contrast, they are called questions of  justice. To be 
sure, these two categories are typically not equated in this fashion; to do so, moreover, might strike 
one as being somewhat irresponsible. Steeped in the vocabulary of  enlightenment liberalism for well 
over three hundred years, the West has come to embrace for the most part the notion that 
individuals possess a right of  “self-determination,” the right to find for themselves what is valuable 
and meaningful in their lives. But is it not indulgent to talk in this way of  the political sphere, where 
as Arendt so aptly notes, “not life but the world is at stake?”167 On the contrary, I would argue; 
where the stakes are higher, so much greater is our duty to own up to the reality of  the task that lies 
before us.
 It cannot be denied, however, that justice is rarely framed in the terms I have laid out. It has, 
however, been framed in just about every other way imaginable. For Plato, justice is a condition of  a 
well-ordered body politic, wherein each element performs – and only performs – its appropriate 
function. Aristotle, by contrast, defines justice in Nicomachean Ethics as “complete virtue,” in the 
sense that justice involves behaving virtuously towards oneself  and others, whereas virtue per se does 
not specify to whom it is exercised in relation.168 Among those who define justice with respect to 
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distribution of  societal “goods” (money, power, prestige, etc.), there are those who hold that this 
should be done on a utilitarian basis (Bentham, Mill), on grounds that are blind to factors without 
moral desert (Rawls), that any redistribution on the basis of  a “patterned” outcome is by definition 
unjust (Nozick), and that it is improper to speak of  non-monetary goods as being “distributable” in 
this sense (Michael Walzer, Iris Marion Young). Communitarians like Michael Sandel, on the other 
hand, argue that issues concerning rights and justice cannot be resolved without a substantive 
engagement with moral questions, and thus that justice entails determining “the right way to value 
things,” prior to “the right way to distribute things.”169
 This is, obviously, a shallow and selective genealogy of  justice. Nonetheless, I think it is 
sufficient to raise the following point: how can it be that all these accounts, which differ so radically 
in content, are even intelligible as the expressions of  the same idea? Sandel, I think, comes closest to 
furnishing a convincing answer; since the issues we discuss in the context of  justice are only 
decidable on the basis of  determining certain common values, this must be what justice is about at 
its core. But Sandel goes on to argue that this means we must – to put it crudely – hold more values 
in common, which reduces his conception to one specific view among many. What Sandel 
misunderstands is that the extent to which we desire to share certain common values is itself a 
question of  justice; that justice itself  is fundamentally a matter of  conceiving the purpose of  the 
state, of  determining the end of  politics.
 Approaching this question as if  it were a matter of  factual truth to be “discovered,” as 
though there were one right answer to be reached through “the theoretical considerations… of  one 
person,”170 can only lead to utter confusion. And theological niceties aside, what we can be certain 
of  above all in light of  the events of  the 20th and early 21st centuries is either there is no God, or 
that at the very least He has been taking a somewhat “hands-off ” approach to human affairs now 
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for quite some time. Thus, with no recourse to the two modes by which we are traditionally 
accustomed to establishing “truth” – scientific discovery and divine revelation – we find ourselves in 
a world where we have no access to “objective” values by which to orient our conduct; yet where we 
must also share that world with other people who, like ourselves, desire happiness (in a broad, non-
hedonistic sense), and would like if  at all possible to avoid a life that is, to use Hobbes’ memorable 
phrase, “nasty, brutish and short.” But this is no reason to think that there can be no such thing as 
truth in the realm of  politics. On the contrary, it merely points to the inadequacy of  our traditional 
conceptions of  truth to a situation in which we find ourselves, as Arendt puts it, “confronted anew, 
without the religious trust in a sacred beginning and without the protections of  traditional and 
therefore self-evident standards of  behavior, by the elementary problems of  human living-
together.”171
 A more adequate view of  “political truths,” I think, is to see these truths as resulting from a 
creative disclosing of  the meaning of  things like “justice” and “the state,” of  the meaning of  politics 
itself. But here my account has diverged from Arendt’s in two respects. Firstly, Arendt herself  never 
spoke of  justice in this way; in fact, she never spoke much of  it at all. It is only in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem that she discusses justice at any great length; and as one might surmise from the book’s 
subject, it is framed there in an exclusively retributive sense. This is, needless to say, an extremely 
narrow way to conceptualize justice; moreover, it is very telling that Arendt grants it this narrow 
interpretation. For much of  what we traditionally discuss in terms of  justice falls under the domain 
of  what Arendt would call “the social” – economic concerns that, for her, must necessarily be 
excluded from the realm of  politics. Any serious consideration of  the role played by “the social” in 
Arendt’s thought would stray excessively far from the topic at hand; therefore, I will merely note 
here that I, along with many other interpreters, think Arendt draws an unnecessarily sharp 
distinction between “social” and “political” concerns, and that it is impossible to conceive of  a 
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politics which does not in some way implicate the former. Thus, I have no problem using the word 
“justice” in the way I do here, to capture an element of  political life which I think is implied by, but 
not fully explicated in Arendt’s account.
 A more substantive objection, I think, is that Arendt would probably not take kindly to my 
characterization of  politics as a creative act. On the contrary, I suspect that she would vehemently 
object to this view, which to her would signify a transfer of  the violence wrought in the creative act 
(which belongs to the realm of  work) to politics. In doing so, however, I think she would be 
fundamentally mistaken. The execution of  any creative act necessarily entails violence; the fitting of  
raw matter into the mold shaped by consciousness. What we typically think of  as the truly “creative” 
part of  any endeavor, however, occurs prior to this violence; it lies in the determination of  the 
“end” itself  (for this reason we would not typically call a painting a “creative work” if  it consists 
merely in a duplication of  another painting). Insofar as this end is determined by one person – “in 
the act that founds a political state,”172 for example – the freedom of  the remaining body politic lies 
in abeyance; their possibilities for “living-together” are no longer their own. Only in the case that 
every interested citizen actively partakes in this creative process – by collaboratively disclosing 
“common concerns and of  modes of  action for realizing them,” – is it possible for freedom to be 
retained in any meaningful sense. 
 To see what this co-disclosure might look like in practice, let us return to the story of  Daniel 
Ellsberg. The words and actions of  Randy Kehler “shattered” (to use one of  Heidegger’s favorite 
phrases) Ellsberg’s thinking; not, moreover, as it pertained to a “world” of  equipment, but in his 
understanding of  what it means to be American, of  the narrative of  our common history and the 
values realized therein. Ellsberg, we might recall, at first felt deeply proud of  his country when 
listening to Kehler’s speech – What a good example of  an American he is, he thought, the best we have. His 
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realization that Kehler was going to jail shattered his conception of  what America was and where it 
was headed; it cast into sharp relief  the disparity between the principles Kehler manifested in his 
words and deeds and the failure of  his country to live up to those same principles. Whatever 
Heidegger meant when he spoke of  “the power of  destiny” disclosed by “communicating and… 
struggling,”173 I think Ellsberg’s story is a more apt manifestation of  the truth contained in those 
words than he could have ever envisioned. For, as Americans for example, we unquestionably do 
share a common destiny.174 It is a destiny we choose through our words and actions – whether we shall 
live up to the more noble moments of  our nation’s history, or whether we shall be doomed to repeat 
the monstrous follies of  our not too distant past. For “every living word fights the battle and puts 
up for decision what is holy and what unholy, what great and what small, what brave and what 
cowardly”175 – and, just as surely, what is American and what not. 
 The point, then, is that there is an unbroken continuity between the disclosure of  the self  
through action, the forging of  one’s unique life story, and the disclosure of  meaning that I have 
chosen to designate with the term justice; the co-discovery of  our common values as people, the 
forging of  our unique historical destiny. It is no doubt possible for that destiny to be seized by one 
person – a “hero,” as Heidegger puts it – but it is foolish to pretend that we can be free as citizens, 
that we can authentically engage in politics, if  this occurs. It takes no philosophical expertise to see 
that it is our freedom as political beings which is seized in this instance; though I think both Heidegger 
and Arendt’s accounts sharpen our understanding of  this robbery. But if  we understand the “end” 
of  political action as creating a space for freedom, the question we must ask ourselves is this: what 
qualities must this space – our common world – possess if  this freedom is to be established and 
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preserved? To answer this question, we turn now to the act of  constitution-making – the activity 
which founds the political world. 
The Act of  Political Foundation
 For Heidegger, what we might think of  as the “structural elements” of  politics seem to have 
a kind of  Being roughly akin to things that are ready-to-hand.176 The rules, laws and virtues that are 
determinative of  political life, then, are merely expressions of  the “dictatorship” of  the 
“they” (unless, of  course, they spring from Dasein’s authentic “co-historicizing,” in which case they 
are prescribed by an actual dictatorship). Thus, Heidegger would probably hold something like the 
view of  Ezra Pound – that “the ignorant of  one generation set out to make laws, and gullible 
children next try to obey them.”177
 The closest Arendt comes to Heidegger’s view about the structures of  political life is in her 
discussion of  political constitutions. Arendt, however, treats these founding documents in a way that 
resembles more Heidegger’s conception of  language; as a sort of  literal structure wherein politics 
can occur. “Language,” Heidegger writes, “is the house of  Being. In its home man dwells.”178 The 
idea here seems to be that experiences are only given coherency and structure through language;179 
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thus, “Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of  this home,”180 as it is 
thinking that “builds upon the house of  Being.”181 Likewise, Arendt speaks in On Revolution of  “the 
revolutionary spirit of  the last centuries, that is the eagerness to liberate and to build a new house 
where freedom can dwell.”182 She returns to the same metaphor later to note that republican politics 
always occurs “within the framework and according to the regulations of  a constitution which… is 
no more the expression of  a national will or subject to the will of  a majority than a building is the 
expression of  the will of  its architect or subject to the will of  its inhabitants.”183 It is clear, then, that 
freedom for Arendt can be found within these sorts of  political structures; in the quite literal sense 
that they provide a shelter within which freedom can potentially become manifest.
 But there is also a sense for Arendt in which freedom is to be found in the act of  foundation 
itself; indeed, nowhere is her distinction between “work” and “action” more untenable than in this 
regard. Arendt writes:
To the extent that the greatest event in every revolution is the act of  foundation, the spirit of 
revolution contains two elements, which to us seem irreconcilable and even contradictory. 
The act of  founding the new body politic, of  devising the new form of  government involves 
the grave concern with the stability and durability of  the new structure; the experience, on 
the other hand, which those who are engaged in this grave business are bound to have is the 
exhilarating awareness of  the human capacity of  beginning, the high spirits which have 
always attended the birth of  something new on earth.184
Contrary to Arendt’s assertion, these two elements hardly seem “contradictory” unless one is taking 
great pains to force all reality into one conceptual framework: in this instance, a rigid trichotomy of  
labor, work and action (clearly, it is the latter two that are in play here). This is not to say that 
Arendt’s conception of  the vita activa is not valuable; but here, as elsewhere, she seems to blind 
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herself  by exclusively adopting this perspective.185 In my view, there is no great leap between the 
disclosure of  the world we find in poetic language and the disclosure of  the self  in speech; on the 
contrary, I have argued that there is an unbroken continuity between these two activities. But in 
many places in her work, Arendt makes the opposite claim; that language is either poetic and world-
building or spoken and self-disclosive, with no discernible overlap between these two functions.186 
Likewise, Arendt in On Revolution wants to make a distinction between the reified, foundational 
“structure” of  a body politic and the substance of  politics itself, which is to be found in action and 
in its subsidiary faculty of  promise-making.  This later faculty, which binds a political body “by an 
agreed purpose for which alone the promises are valid and binding,”187 has something of  “the 
world-building capacity of  man”188 in it, Arendt admits. Indeed, wherever “men succeed in keeping 
intact the power which sprang up between them during the course of  any particular act or deed” – 
which can only be done through “binding and promising” – “they are already in the process of  
foundation, of  constituting a stable worldly structure to house… their combined power of  
action.”189
 Here, Arendt comes exasperatingly close to admitting the obvious: that the only clear-cut 
difference between “the regulations of  a constitution” and a spoken covenant is that the former is 
written down; and that indeed, the latter could just as well be written down too. Arendt’s insistence 
on this (in my mind, conceptually incoherent) distinction is all the more puzzling if  one considers 
that in “What is Freedom?”, Arendt espouses a view nearly identical to the one I am espousing here:
All political business is, and always has been, transacted within an elaborate framework of  
ties and bonds for the future – such as laws and constitutions, treaties and alliances – all of  
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which derive in the last instance from the faculty to promise and to keep promises in the 
face of  the essential uncertainties of  the future. 190
Later in the same essay, Arendt makes an even stronger claim: that men “can establish a reality of  
their own” through the “twofold gift” of  freedom and action. This is, I think, an essential point, for 
it implies that the political world both conditions and is conditioned by disclosure through speech and action. I shall 
return to this issue later; for now, its principal relevance is that it throws into question the privileging 
of  constitution-making in establishing a space for politics.
 But as confusing as Arendt’s treatment of  these issues might be, she does have a valid reason 
for wanting to distinguish the act of  foundation from other instances of  political action; for it is the 
precepts laid down by this act in particular that do indeed assume a reified, one might even say 
“ready-to-hand” quality. “The moment promises lose their character as isolated islands of  certainty,” 
Arendt warns, “…that is, when this faculty is misused to cover the whole ground of  the future and 
to map out a path secured in all directions… the whole enterprise becomes self-defeating.”191 Once 
the binding power of  promises has been entirely usurped by a force of  an entirely different nature –
that of  authority – the freedom belonging to political action is lost. For it is the “moral precepts” of  
mutually binding promises which “are the only ones that are not applied to action from the 
outside”;192 the only ones in which we achieve stability without sacrificing the freedom to determine 
our own potentialities for action. Thus, Arendt wants a politics that is reified to the least possible 
extent; only to that which is necessary to preserve a space for deliberation. 
 “Human plurality,” Arendt writes, which is “the basic condition of  both action and speech,” 
has “the twofold character of  equality and distinction.”193 Both of  these qualities, in turn, require 
that certain worldly conditions be met in order to become manifest. The first condition, Arendt 
contends, “is necessarily an equality of  unequals who stand in need of  being ‘equalized’ in certain 
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respects and for specific purposes.”194 Thus, this equality is unnatural by definition, as it depends on 
the human artifice for its very existence. The pre-political “state of  nature,” though perhaps not as 
miserable as Hobbes would have us think, is certainly not a realm inhabited by equals, and it is 
certainty not a space in which one can speak of  “rights” or “laws” in any meaningful sense; for even 
if  there were some sort of  “natural law” to which one could appeal, the practical benefits of  doing 
so are less than obvious absent some corporeal body to enforce them.195 Yet without this unnatural 
equality, there can be little room for free action and speech – as distinguished from mute acts of  
violence – in the world. Thus, despite the fact that political truths can never “possess the same 
power to compel as the statement that two times two make four,”196 it is the role of  the political 
founding to hold equality as “self-evident,” to use Thomas Jefferson’s immortal phrasing, in order to 
provide a space within which politics, action, and freedom can appear. 
 There is no doubt that Western democracies have largely succeeded in establishing and 
maintaining this unnatural equality, albeit with some shameful exceptions. The tragedy, however, is 
that the reification of  political structures that accompanies political founding rarely stops there; on 
the contrary, the “lost treasure” of  the American Revolution in particular is that “while it had given 
freedom to the people,” it “failed to provide a place where this freedom could be exercised.”197 In 
other words, modern liberal democracies have failed to provide a space for individual distinctiveness 
to be displayed in politics, an arena for disclosure through political action. This failure, particularly in 
modern times, is of  a twofold nature. Its first aspect is that only the people’s representatives, “not 
the people themselves,” are given “an opportunity to engage in those activities of  ‘expressing, 
discussing, and deciding’ which in a positive sense are the activities of  freedom.”198 All that can be 
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represented in this way, Arendt writes, "is interest, or the welfare of  the constituents, but neither 
their actions nor their opinions.”199 Electoral politics, then, are no substitute for the freedom found 
in political action.
 The second aspect of  this failure is that even the representatives of  the people find their 
freedom of  action constrained by a variety of  different factors. In his book Profiles in Courage, then-
Senator John F. Kennedy identified three “terrible pressures which discourage acts of  political 
courage”;200 the need for representatives to get along with their colleagues, the fear of  making 
decisions unpopular with their constituents, and the pressure of  special interests (the conflicting 
demands exercised by this last group, Kennedy writes, “only reflect the inconsistencies inevitable in 
our complex economy”201 – a testament to the acumen of  Arendt’s insight regarding the 
representability of  interests but not opinions). The conscientious representative, Kennedy tells us, 
thus “realizes that once he begins to weigh each issue in terms of  his chances for reelection, once he 
begins to compromise away his principles on one issue after another for fear that to do otherwise 
would halt his career and prevent future fights for principles, then he has lost the very freedom of  
conscience which justifies his continuance in office.”202
 As a result of  these failures, freedom and action tend to lead what Wolin calls a “fugitive” 
existence in modern democracies, frequently occurring outside the bounds of  the state. Arendt 
considered the acts of  civil disobedience perpetrated by the civil rights movement as examples of  
political action in her time; one might perhaps look at the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street 
movements for more recent examples. “It is my contention,” she wrote in a 1970 essay, “that civil 
disobedients are nothing but the latest form of  voluntary association, and that they are thus quite in 
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tune with the oldest traditions of  the country.”203  As Arendt conceived of  these groups, they 
resemble in many ways an ordinary political body before its reification; with the exception that 
instead of  agreeing upon some concept of  justice to be administered by the group itself, these 
groups instead have some concept of  what is just – a narrower one, perhaps limited to a single issue 
– and attempt to effect political change by swaying the opinion of  the body politic as a whole. 
 Thus, political action is possible even if  formal political institutions fail to provide an arena 
for it to be exercised. But what is utterly essential for these groups is that they be given the 
opportunity to appear, and for the distinctiveness of  their individual actors to be made manifest. As 
Arendt writes, “there is all the difference in the world between the criminal’s avoiding the public eye 
and the civil disobedient’s taking the law into his own hands in open defiance.”204 Thus, it is essential 
not that the formal political structure, but rather that the world as a whole be a space for disclosure 
– an arena where political actors can appear in the light of  the public realm.
The World and Action
 In the summer of  2002, writer Ron Suskind had a curious conversation with an unnamed 
official within the second Bush Administration:
The aide said that guys like me were ''in what we call the reality-based community,'' which he 
defined as people who ''believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of  
discernible reality.'' I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and 
empiricism. He cut me off. ''That's not the way the world really works anymore,'' he 
continued. ''We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while 
you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new 
realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's 
actors… and you, all of  you, will be left to just study what we do.''205
Hear me! For I am such and such a person. Above all, do not mistake me for someone else!
-Friedrich Nietzsche
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This statement is now widely attributed to Karl Rove, and has since become the object of  
widespread mockery in left wing circles around the United States. This is a shame, I think, because 
there is very little that is funny about Rove’s statement; on the contrary, there is a profound truth in 
what he is saying. If  there is a joke here, it is being had at the expense of  the “reality-based 
community”; and to see why, we must return to Arendt’s claim that “men… because they have 
received the twofold gift of  freedom and action[,] can establish a reality of  their own.”206
 The obvious way to interpret this statement is to take Arendt as saying that men alter reality 
by making physical changes therein; I throw a stone off  a cliff, and reality has changed. If  this is all 
Arendt means, then this is a rather banal claim. But there is another way in which we can interpret 
this statement. Reality, we might recall, only appears to us as it is mediated by a cultural “world of  
meaning”; a more profound interpretation of  Arendt’s statement, then, is to take her as saying that 
men “establish a reality of  their own” through speech and action by changing this world of  meaning. This 
leads us to an even more striking conclusion, which I alluded to before; not only do the structures of 
our common world – our political system, for example – determine whether there is a space for 
speech and action in the public sphere, but that world itself  (both in its physical manifestations and 
in its web of  stories and meanings) is disclosed by our words and deeds.207 In other words, action and 
the world in which we act are mutually conditioning. Obviously, we find ourselves at this point dealing with a 
circle; the only way in which we can understand this mutually constituted relationship, then, is to 
leap in. Thus, I shall begin by discussing action’s conditioning of  the world, before turning to the 
world’s capacity to condition speech and action. 
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 Action has a world-building capacity in a twofold sense. Firstly, it creates and maintains the 
more tangible worldly structures of  politics, as exemplified in the act of  political foundation. 
Secondly, the doing of  great deeds and the speaking of  great words has the capacity to shatter 
individuals’ worlds of  meaning; this, in turn, opens up those individuals to new meanings and new 
possibilities for action. The contemporary relevance of  this latter capacity cannot possibly be 
understated. For the most divisive issues in the United States today are those where the partisans on 
either side are, in a very real sense, no longer speaking the same language, where words simply do 
not carry the same underlying meanings for everyone involved in the debate. You say “torture,” I say 
“enhanced interrogation”; you say “abortion,” I say “murder”; and so on. I would go so far as to say 
that most truly intractable moral disputes stem from differences in how people understand words’ 
underlying meanings, as well the related issue of  which words are appropriately applied to which 
phenomena. Thus, is it only through the “shattering” effect of  speech and action that that we might 
arrive at a common understanding from which real politics can occur. In one of  her many prescient 
moments, Arendt warned that the real danger the student movement faced in the late 1960s was its 
“growing infection... with ideologies (Maoism, Castroism, Stalinism, Marxism-Leninism, and the 
like), which in fact split and dissolve the association.”208 Not only have these divisions indeed 
paralyzed the radical left’s ability to act in the decades since Arendt’s death, but such ideologies 
themselves have a paralyzing effect on the thinking of  those who follow them. As Elizabeth Young-
Bruehl writes in her biography of  Arendt:
Anyone thus predetermined [by ideological frameworks] becomes unable to experience 
directly or concretely as well as unable to reflect back freely on experience. Independent 
thought is mobile – free in the most elementary sense. For those lacking independence, 
everything is prepackaged, but such people do not recognize the abstract quality of  their 
thought because they are impressed by the charge they feel in anticipation of  actual 
experiences, upon which they impose a prefabricated language. Among the sixties moralists 
who criticized Arendt and whom Arendt criticized, the most common prefabricated scripts 
featured violence justified and violence falsely equated with power, which grows up when 
people join in political action and institutionalize their common efforts. Arendt felt that their 
scripts closed off  the young people to the novel realities of  the world historical moment that 
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these same young people had created with their moral fervor. Arendt marveled to Jaspers 
about a member of  the German Gruppe 47 who visited with her in Chicago: “Still so young 
and already totally incapable of  learning anything. Sees in everything only more support for 
his prejudices, can’t absorb anything concrete, factual anymore” (21 May 1966).209
 It is the warning contained in this last sentence that provides perhaps the most compelling 
reason for why the world must be maintained as a space for speech and action. Heidegger and 
Arendt both speak in various places of  what Heidegger calls “the danger”; that man will forget his 
essence as a truth-disclosing being, and become trapped within one “world,” one perfectly closed 
circuit of  prefabricated concepts that allows for no escape. The delusion then arises, Heidegger 
writes, that “man everywhere and always encounters only himself.”210 Arendt and Heidegger both 
express this fear in the face of  modern science and technology; whatever the merits of  this concern, 
this is not the place to consider them. But Arendt also raises this fear in a different setting; under 
“conditions of  mass society or mass hysteria,” she writes, “where we see all people suddenly behave 
as though they were members of  one family, each multiplying and prolonging the perspective of  his 
neighbor,” it is possible for people to become  “imprisoned in the subjectivity of  their own singular 
experience, which does not cease to be singular if  the same experience is multiplied innumerable 
times.” The result is “the end of  the common world” in any meaningful sense, and the rise of  a 
different sort of  world: one “seen only under one aspect and… permitted to present itself  in only 
one perspective.”211 
 This danger, of  course, is the danger of  totalitarianism. But what is striking here is that 
because of  speech and action’s ability to both shatter existing meanings and to disclose new ones, 
the danger of  totalitarianism and our power to resist that danger both arise from within action itself. Adolf 
Hitler, of  course, was renowned and feared for his rhetorical prowess; it was his profound gift in this 
regard that allowed him to lead Germany down the path that ended in the Holocaust. But Hitler did 
not do this by himself, and it is here that we are prepared to grasp the other half  of  the circle I 
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mentioned previously; for the “reality” Hitler established through action was one which fed back upon 
itself. One man alone cannot make a Holocaust; it took the propaganda machine of  the Nazi Party to 
extend Hitler’s grasp until it reached into every aspect of  German life; it took the violence of  the 
Night of  Long Knives and the Kristallnacht to silence those who might have broken that iron grip. 
Hitler’s words and deeds, in short, created certain worldly conditions; these in turn allowed for the 
domination of  a singular perspective on a scale never before seen in human history.
 What Suskind and his ilk have utterly failed to understand, then, is that reality itself  is 
entirely constituted by the interwoven fabric of  shared meanings and narratives that make up our 
common world;212 and that this fabric in turn is the singular result of  speech and action, as well as 
the human faculty of  thought which underlies them both. To be sure, the terrorist attacks of  
September 11th, 2001 “shattered” the American experience in a way the Bush Administration could 
not have possibly anticipated. But once this shattering occurred, the administration wasted no time 
in filling the void it left behind with new meanings: “regime change,” “non-enemy combatants,” 
“enhanced interrogation methods,” and so on. These meanings in turn were used to tell a particular 
narrative: that we were under attack from a culture that hated us for our freedom, that certain 
individuals and countries were responsible for this attack, that barbaric means were justified by the 
ends of  defeating terrorism abroad and ensuring our safety at home. Avenues by which this narrative 
could be contested were cut off  by stacking press conferences with friendly plants, as well through 
the advent of  completely fabricated events like the infamous “Mission Accomplished” address given 
by Bush in 2003.213 And even had such avenues been available, the overwhelming fervor of  
patriotism that permeated American political life in the attacks’ aftermath made dissent nearly 
impossible; as White House press secretary Ari Fleischer ominously noted, “people have to watch 
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what they say and watch what they do” in such times.214 The world indeed changed on 9/11; but 
more importantly, 9/11 cleared a path for even greater changes to come; and the sad irony of  this is 
that the American left merely looked on in incredulity and incomprehension as a new reality 
unfolded before its very eyes. 
 This is not, of  course, to say that the second Bush Administration constituted as extreme an 
existential threat to freedom and democracy as Hitler’s Third Reich. Nor is it to say that America has 
not experienced this totalitarian danger in the past. Arendt herself, in fact, saw such a threat in the 
“ex-Communist” movement of  the 1950s. At that time, Arendt wrote:
America, this republic, the democracy in which we live, is a living thing which cannot be 
contemplated and categorized, like the image of  a thing which I can make; it cannot be 
fabricated. It is not and never will be perfect because the standard of  perfection does not 
apply here. Dissent belongs to this living matter as much as consent does. The limitations of  
dissent lie in the Constitution and the Bill of  Rights and nowhere else. If  you try to "make 
America more American" or a model of  democracy according to any preconceived idea, you 
can only destroy it... In this role, you can only strengthen those dangerous elements which 
are present in all free societies today and which we do not want to crystallize into a 
totalitarian movement or a totalitarian form of  domination, no matter what its cause and 
ideological content.215
If  it is possible to locate a moment in which this totalitarian threat was neutralized, the obvious 
moment to choose would be the notorious exchange between Senator Joseph McCarthy and Joseph 
Welch that occurred during the 1954 Army-McCarthy hearings. In turning to this is event, the point 
I wish to make is that in the same way propaganda and fabricated events serve to promote one 
dominating, totalitarian perspective, unmediated exchanges allow not just for individual disclosure, 
but for the shattering of  this totalitarian, world-building endeavor.  
 I presume that the reader is already familiar with the context in which the Army-McCarthy 
hearings took place; thus, I will skip over the extraneous details and begin with the events relevant to 
our discussion. In response to Welch’s pressing of  McCarthy’s associate, Roy Cohn, on the list 
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McCarthy claimed to possess of  130 “subversives” within the U.S. Government, McCarthy retaliated 
by revealing that one of  Welch’s associates, who had no connection with the hearing, had belonged 
to the National Lawyers Guild, an alleged Communist front organization. Welch responded:
Until this moment, Senator, I think I never really gauged your cruelty or your recklessness. 
Fred Fisher is a young man who went to the Harvard Law School and came into my firm 
and is starting what looks to be a brilliant career with us.
When I decided to work for this committee I asked Jim St. Clair, who sits on my right, to be 
my first assistant. I said to Jim, “Pick somebody in the firm who works under you that you 
would like.” He chose Fred Fisher and they came down on an afternoon plane. That night, 
when he had taken a little stab at trying to see what the case was about, Fred Fisher and Jim 
St. Clair and I went to dinner together. I then said to these two young men, “Boys, I don’t 
know anything about you except I have always liked you, but if  there is anything funny in the 
life of  either one of  you that would hurt anybody in this case you speak up quick.”
Fred Fisher said, “Mr. Welch, when I was in law school and for a period of  months after, I 
belonged to the Lawyers Guild,” as you have suggested, Senator. He went on to say, “I am 
secretary of  the Young Republicans League in Newton with the son of  Massachusetts' 
Governor, and I have the respect and admiration of  the 25 lawyers or so in Hale & Dorr.”
I said, “Fred, I just don’t think I am going to ask you to work on the case. If  I do, one of  
these days that will come out and go over national television and it will just hurt like the 
dickens.”
So, Senator, I asked him to go back to Boston.
Little did I dream you could be so reckless and cruel as to do an injury to that lad. It is true 
he is still with Hale & Dorr. It is true that he will continue to be with Hale & Dorr. It is, I 
regret to say, equally true that I fear he shall always bear a scar needlessly inflicted by you. If  
it were in my power to forgive you for your reckless cruelty, I would do so. I like to think I 
am a gentleman, but your forgiveness will have to come from someone other than me.
McCarthy, however, continued: 
I just give this man’s record, and I want to say, Mr. Welch, that it has been labeled long 
before he became a member, as early as 1944—
Mr. WELCH. Senator, may we not drop this? We know he belonged to the Lawyers Guild, 
and Mr. Cohn nods his head at me. I did you, I think, no personal injury, Mr. Cohn.
Mr. COHN. No, sir.
Mr. WELCH. I meant to do you no personal injury, and if  I did, beg your pardon.
Let us not assassinate this lad further, Senator. You have done enough. Have you no sense of 
decency sir, at long last? Have you left no sense of  decency?
 The utterly personal nature of  this exchange is remarkable; not merely in the sense that the 
personal life of  Fred Fisher was brought onto the House floor, but in the sense that in this dialogue, 
free of  all scripts and handlers and mediating structures, McCarthy’s self was disclosed before the 
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House gallery and the audience watching on their televisions at home. And the person who was 
disclosed was clearly a despicable man. But moreover, the principles McCarthy made manifest in 
speech and action were made apparent for the first time too; fear, distrust, hatred, and an utter 
aversion to free thought. The “world” that McCarthy was attempting to create through his actions, a 
world that manifested these “principles,” a world in which being branded a communist would 
forever destroy one’s life, was utterly imploded by this exchange; an exchange which was only 
possible because of  the human artifice that placed McCarthy and Welch on equal ground before an 
attentive audience. This sort of  exchange could not have happened at a fabricated media event; it 
could not have happened without an arena for action. Thus, we can now grasp the full nature of  the 
opposition between the words and deeds of  McCarthy, which belong to that totalitarian action 
which strives to close off  the world, and the sort of  action which strives to maintain the world as a 
realm of  freedom, as an open space for disclosure. After McCarthy tried once more to press the 
issue of  Mr. Fisher’s membership in the NLG, Welch responded:
Mr. McCarthy, I will not discuss this with you further. You have sat within 6 feet of  me, and 
could have asked me about Fred Fisher. You have brought it out. If  there is a God in 
heaven, it will do neither you nor your cause any good. I will not discuss it further. I will not 
ask Mr. Cohn any more questions. You, Mr. Chairman, may, if  you will, call the next witness.
The House gallery then burst into applause. 
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Conclusion: Action and Responsibility for the World
 
 Throughout her published work, Hannah Arendt consistently maintained two positions that 
were very much in tension. The first of  these is that there are no objective moral standards or 
transcendent bannisters for action to be found in the world. The second is that the Holocaust, that 
horror in which Arendt narrowly escaped being engulfed herself, was one of  the most abominable 
events in the history of  mankind. But her account of  action, at least in the form that I have 
somewhat creatively presented it here, does not seem to do much to resolve these tensions. I have 
spoken of  America’s “destiny” – is not this “destiny” essentially arbitrary? Have I not in fact 
admitted the contingency of  our tradition, and abandoned – to slightly alter the words of  Richard 
Rorty – the idea that freedom can be justified, and its totalitarian enemies refuted?216
 Indeed, both our words and deeds would be entirely arbitrary if  our destiny were something 
preordained; if, as Heidegger claimed, our fates are somehow “guided in advance.” But this is not 
the case. I am not denying here our nature as historically conditioned beings; in that respect, our 
situation is indeed contingent. But our destiny as a nation is something that we choose, and this is the 
utterly essential point. For even though we might, if  we are honest with ourselves, be forced to 
admit that our political values cannot possess a mathematical or scientific or perhaps even a divine 
grounding, this does not mean that truth must be banished from politics. On the contrary; even if  adopt a 
perspective whereby our world seems utterly contingent, I suspect that we will still find that we 
desire certain aspects of  that world to be retained. It is my contention that this desire is not 
arbitrary; and it is here that Arendt’s account can help us understand how this might be so. 
Such is the city for which these men fought valienatly and died, in the firm belief  that it should never 
be destroyed… Look at the power our city shows in action every day, and so become lovers of  Athens.
-Pericles
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 I have suggested in this paper that there are two senses in which one might understand 
Arendt’s account of  action. The first of  these is to understand it in opposition to “behavior.” What 
this entails is freedom from the banisters of  established norms, such that the concepts that guide 
our actions – means, motives, ends – are seized upon to disclose our own possibilities, rather than 
those preordained by the public world. The second sense defines action more narrowly; it is action 
of  the first kind, but that which occurs through deliberation with others in a sort of  free, creative 
process. This kind of  action, moreover, strives to create and maintain a space for this public 
freedom; it is thus opposed to the totalitarian action that wishes to close off  the world as a space for 
disclosure. I would now like to define this second sense of  action – the anti-totalitarian kind – as 
assuming responsibility for the world. 
 Responsibility is meant here in a multiplicity of  senses. Most obviously, it is meant as 
responsibility to preserve the physical human artifice – as well as the natural world – through action, 
in the absence of  which we might well see both worlds destroyed within our lifetimes. Less 
obviously, it also entails taking responsibility for one’s own “world of  meaning” through the solitary 
act of  thinking – which, as Arendt notes in the conclusion to The Human Condition, might well 
surpass the components of  the vita activa in terms of  its “sheer activity.”217
 But most decisively of  all, action in this second sense entails taking responsibility for the 
common world that we share with others. Under this interpretation, our duty is not to preserve the 
world in just any form, but as a place fit for action and speech; as a house in which freedom can 
dwell. This means engaging in public discourse about the meanings of  the fundamental terms that 
structure our political life: What are our values? What is our justice? What does it mean to be 
American? Moreover, this entails not advocacy, not discourse as a means to further one’s 
preconceived ends, but truly engaging  in a collaborative disclosure of  the meanings by which we 
ultimately determine ourselves as a body politic. It requires becoming free for this creative project 
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ourselves and, through “communication and struggle” – to appropriate Heidegger’s phrase – helping 
others become free for this task as well. Finally, taking responsibility in this sense requires throwing 
oneself  into the public sphere, not only to inspire action in others (“One man with courage makes a 
majority,” as Andrew Jackson said), but so that we might also challenge those who would put an end 
to this collaborative disclosure; who would close off  the world as a space for freedom.
 Lacking from these considerations is any argument for why one should assume responsibility 
in this way, for why one should bother to act in the first place.218 This is entirely proper, I think. One 
of  the points that has arisen in our consideration of  Arendt and Heidegger is that as free beings, we 
ultimately bear total responsibility for our actions; no justification for action I could offer would 
amount to anything but an inconsequential gloss upon this fact. But I do not think it would be 
inappropriate at this juncture to reflect upon what it means that we find ourselves in this situation.
 I have already touched briefly upon Heidegger’s notion of  “thrownness”; I return to it now 
to make the following point. As human beings, our existence is “thrown” in two ways: in the 
violence of  being thrown into a world whose nature is ultimately beyond our control, and in our 
thrownness unto death, the inexorable return into the nothingness from which we came. This is, to 
be sure, a distressing situation; what’s more, we find ourselves both “doomed to be free”219 (to use 
Arendt’s somewhat uninspired reworking of  Sartre’s famous phrase) while simultaneously bearing 
total responsibility for actions we undertake with no guidance but that of  our fellow men, who of  
course know nothing more than we do and find themselves in the same distressing condition. 
 There are, to be sure, innumerable ways in which one might react to this state of  affairs; 
here, I would like to suggest two. The first is to flee before the totality of  our situation; before 
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freedom, before death, before the contingency of  the “world” in which we have been brought up. 
There is very little to say to someone who wishes to take this route, though it is curious to 
contemplate how one could deign to do so consciously – generally, when we think of  persons 
“fleeing” in this sense, it is a flight away from such conscious understanding. But, were someone 
intent on pursuing this course as a deliberate strategy, there is truly nothing that could be said to 
dissuade that person. As Robert Nozick writes, “Though philosophy is carried on as a coercive 
activity, the penalty philosophers wield is, after all, rather weak.”220
 At the opposite end of  the spectrum, one might choose to embrace one’s thrown existence; 
this attitude is what Arendt calls amor mundi, or “love of  the world.” One could understand this to 
mean loving the world as it is, which would be a rather banal interpretation. A more interesting route 
is to take amor mundi as demanding that we embrace the human condition, of  which our fundamental 
freedom is an essential element. It follows, then, that one who loves the world should protect and 
preserve this freedom through action. Thus, I suspect it is no coincidence that Arendt writes that 
our self-insertion into the human world through action is “like a second birth, in which we confirm 
and take upon ourselves the naked fact of  our original physical appearance.”221
 Though I can offer no argument here for why one should take responsibility for the world, 
or even for why one should love the world, it is my contention here that there is an essential 
relationship between these two attitudes. Conversely, the totalitarian action that seeks to close off  
the world seems closely intertwined with the attitude of  flight from – and perhaps resentment 
towards – the human condition. This is, I hope, a not too contentious proposition. What I suspect 
might be met with more resistance is what I would like to suggest next: that just as freedom is the 
ground of  truth for Heidegger, there is a way in which truth can be taken as the supreme end of  
freedom in Arendt’s account. This, on its face, sounds baffling and counterintuitive; is not the 
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pursuit of  Truth the very essence of  the totalitarian, means-end action that both Arendt and I 
reject? But what I propose here is not to posit any particular “truth” as a supreme end; rather, it is to 
establish and maintain a space for freedom and political disclosure. Moreover, the disclosures that 
occur within this space are not arbitrary; they are how truth enters the political realm in the first 
place. To be clear: the disclosures that occur in politics can be essentially deceptive and concealing; 
but they can also be fundamentally illuminating, and this is the case when disclosure is most in its 
essence. Heidegger writes in Being and Time that:
To say that before Newton his laws were neither true not false, cannot signify that before 
him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. 
Through Newton the laws became true and with them, entities became accessible in 
themselves to Dasein. Once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as 
[the] entities which [they] beforehand already were. Such uncovering is the kind of  Being 
which belongs to ‘truth’.222
 I have already made clear that I do not think political truths and scientific truths can be 
unreservedly equated; nonetheless, I think that what Heidegger says here is perfectly applicable to 
politics as well. The idea that black slaves were somehow “subhuman” depended on a web of  
meanings – “black” and “white” in particular – that were fundamentally untrue, which I have argued is 
the case with phrases like “enhanced interrogation methods” as well.223 Thus, the politics I propose 
is not one that “is content to call ‘true’ (or ‘right’ or ‘just’) whatever the outcome of  undistorted 
communication happens to be”224; nor is it a politics of  unreserved pluralism. It is one which 
demands confrontation through speech and action, through the shattering of  both our individual and 
shared worlds of  meaning. There is, obviously, a tension here. For the disclosure of  truth that I am 
describing requires an open space in which it can occur – otherwise, we are left with Heidegger’s 
account of  truth in politics, which both destroys individuals’ political freedom and produces 
“truths” that do not deserve to bear the name. But this account also implies that there must come a 
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time when we can not abide certain practices, such as black slavery, to continue. In other words, 
there will come a time when we must use violence; but then we must also allow ourselves to feel the 
full weight of  our anxiety, our guilt, our responsibility. We must in other words, as Nietzsche says, 
invent the justice that acquits everyone except ourselves.225 Simone de Beauvoir once wrote:
Kierkegaard has said that what distinguishes the pharisee from the genuinely moral man is 
that the former considers his anguish a sure sign of  his virtue; from the fact that he asks 
himself, “Am I Abraham?” he concludes, “I am Abraham;” but morality resides in the 
painfulness of  an indefinite questioning. The problem which we are posing is not the same 
as that of  Kierkegaard; the important thing to us is to know whether, in given conditions, 
Isaac must be killed or not. But we also think that what distinguishes the tyrant from the 
man of  good will is that the first rests in the certainty of  his aims, whereas the second keeps 
asking himself, “Am I really working for the liberation of  men?”
 What de Beauvoir says here can aid us in distinguishing the pursuit of  Truth from that of  
disclosure, of  the clearing where freedom can appear. For one who pursues the former, the truth is 
already known and explained; it possess a finality that is appropriate to one who believes in 
“supreme ends.” But there is no finality to truth in the latter sense; it is, and always will be unfolding, 
and the goal is not to protect (or enforce) any particular truth but to protect the disclosure itself. 
This leads us to pursue a markedly distinct set of  ends. It demands that we consciously take 
responsibility for the world through word and deed, and that we seek to free others for this 
endeavor as well. It enjoins us to recognize the freedom that resides in the essential nature of  all 
human beings. Finally, it requires that we oppose totalitarianism; the oblivion of  freedom, the 
pursuit of  one end and the one domination of  one perspective at the expense of  all others, the 
forgetting of  our disclosive nature. Ironically enough, it is Heidegger who almost puts it best; the 
highest dignity of  man’s essence, he writes, “lies in keeping watch over the unconcealment – and 
with it… the concealment – of  all essential unfolding on earth.”226 But what makes Heidegger’s 
perspective fatally myopic is that it fails to grasp that “keeping watch” alone will never be enough to 
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preserve freedom. For this task, we must become “lovers of  Athens,”227 as Pericles said in his famed 
funeral oration; we must become men of  action. Or to quote a more recent eulogy:
But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate—we can not consecrate—we can not hallow—
this ground… It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work 
which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here 
dedicated to the great task remaining before us… that we here highly resolve that these dead 
shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of  freedom
—and that government of  the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from 
the earth.
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